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Abstract 
This thesis examines how mobile phones affect political activity. In a number of cases, the 
mobile phone as a uniquely easy-to-use and personal communication device has been a key 
tool to facilitate mobilization and collective action, such as during the impeachment process 
of President Estrada of the Philippines in 2001. Taking some of these case studies as a 
starting point, I find a plausible theoretical framework for analysis in the literature on 
collective action theory, mobilization and diffusion theory, and network society theory, 
which I develop further to include the novel aspect of mobile telecommunications. Mobile 
teledensity data and three political activism indicators in 191 countries are then tested with 
negative binomial Poisson and ordinal logistic regression over a period of 16 years. The 
results do not confirm the observations of the earlier case studies; I find no significant 
relationship between mobile teledensity and anti-government protests, riots, or major 
government crises. 
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1. Introduction: A New Tool for Civil Society? 
 “Mobile communication is said to enhance the autonomy of individuals, enabling them 
to set up their own connections, bypassing the mass media and the channels of 
communication controlled by institutions and organizations” (Castells et al. 2007:1). 
In 2001, the elected President of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada, had to step down 
after weeks of demonstrations in Manila, the capital. The protesters who demanded 
his impeachment were mobilized via their mobile phones, mainly by waves of text 
messages calling for participation in street protests. 
Some authors give mobile phones and networks a lot of credit for shaping outcomes 
such as the one in Manila, calling these mobile-phone enhanced protesters smart 
mobs (Rheingold 2002). But how much does the mobile phone really affect the 
outcome? Are a few calls or text messages enough to challenge the power of the 
state? The events in the Philippines and elsewhere were quite a sensation and have 
led a variety of scholars to embrace the issue and do research on the social and 
political impact of mobile phones. However, little systematic research beyond loose 
collections of case studies has been done so far. I wish to fill this gap by presenting a 
comprehensive theoretical discussion and extending the analysis to a larger number 
of cases using quantitative methods. 
What role does the mobile phone have in social movements, and how does it work? I 
will start with presenting the Filipino event and illustrate the process with two further 
cases. In addition, I will include two interviews I performed with insiders of 
opposition movements, to further elaborate on the impact of mobile phones. 
Next, I will look at what the theoretical literature has to contribute to  the analysis of 
such events. What theories are capable of explaining the phenomenon in question? 
This section will be followedn by a hypothesis on possible political effects of mobile 
telecommunications, one that I will test with statistical methods. 
The results of the regressions are discussed thereafter, followed by some concluding 
remarks and an outlook for future research. 
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1.1 Relevance of the study: A world connected 
“[A researcher from Tufts University] interviewed me a while ago, but he was only 
interested in the Internet. I didn’t have much to say about that, I would have rather 
talked about cell phones. Now there’s finally someone interested in phones!” (Ivan 
Marovic 2008[interview]). 
Mobile phones have, other than the Internet2, only recently received increased 
attention by political scientists (cf. Castells et al. 2007; Meier forthcoming). 
Unfortunately, research on mobile phones in this field and in other social sciences is 
often being lumped together with research on the Internet, usually under the umbrella 
term Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). These studies often fail to 
capture the distinct properties of mobile telecommunications because when they 
claim to analyze ICT, they do, in fact, largely deal with the Internet only (cf. Walker 
2006:9-10; Nicholson 2005). This raises some doubts whether ICT can be useful as a 
concept in the social sciences. 
“[T]echnology is a famously broad notion that is clarified not at all by having 
‘information’ and ‘communication’ hanging off the front of it” (Walker 2006:9). 
 
Walker’s remark nicely subsumes the problem with ICT: it is a fuzzy concept.3 
Where research on modern communication technologies is done, the reference to ICT 
is often a cover-up for poor conceptualization. Measuring the impact of ICT on 
society surely is not limited to the effects of the Internet only. Yet, this is what one 
often encounters: ICT is first defined to include mobile phones, but then left out in 
the actual measurement. This causes validity problems due to a mismatch between 
the concept and indicator level (cf. Adcock and Collier 2001). Moreover, as we will 
see in the next chapter, the Internet appears to be of little significance outside of 
industrialized nations due to a lack of availability and high social thresholds for its 
use. As a consequence, little meaningful research on the Internet, particularly of the 
statistical kind, can be done beyond this limited group of countries. Lumping mobile 
                                              
2 ‘Internet’ and ‘the Web’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
3 The World Bank (2008) defines ICT as “the  hardware, software, networks, and  media for the collection, 
storage, processing, transmission and presentation of information (voice, data, text, images), as well as related 
services”. 
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communications together with Internet research has other limitations too: it 
completely ignores distinct inherent capacities of mobile phones and networks4, 
treating them as if they were “a natural extension of the Internet, rather than an 
entirely distinct system with its own rules, a separate user base, and a completely 
different network structure” (Walker 2006:10). This is clearly unsatisfactory from an 
analytical perspective, especially in light of the worldwide trend that shows rapid 
growth of mobile phone penetration. 
There has long been a thriving body of academic literature describing the virtues of 
the Internet, being such a powerful and liberating tool for civil society5 and its 
activists (cf. Drezner 2006; Deibert et al. 2008; Fisher et al. 2005), while there is no 
such resource to draw from in the case of mobile telecommunications, despite some 
promising works that will be introduced below. This lack of research is partly due to 
the Internet’s earlier emergence compared with mobile telephony, at least with regard 
to its mass deployment. But again, meaningful Internet research is largely contained 
Fig. 1.1 ICT penetration rates, global comparison 
Source: ITU 2007 
                                              
4 ‘Mobile phone networks’ and ‘mobile networks’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
5 Civil society throughout this work commonly refers to value-based movements in the arena of uncoerced 
collective action. It is defined according to the Center for Civil Society at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. See LSE (2004) for a more detailed definition. 
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to developed countries that are connected to the Web, while mobile phones are much 
less affected by these restrictions as figure 1.1 indicates.6 
Mobile phone networks are growing nearly everywhere. The use of mobile handsets 
faces almost no restriction bar affordability, and even the latter is not an impossible 
barrier, as the massive growth rates outside of Europe and North America indicate. 
As some of the case studies presented later will show, mobile phones can be a 
powerful tool for civil society that offer possibilities the Internet cannot provide. 
Some of the mobile phone’s functionalities deserve increased attention and research 
efforts by political scientists along the example of earlier Internet research.  Take for 
example the process of political mobilization; mobile phones can facilitate its 
emergence by virtue of three important factors: mobility, personalization and 
multimodality. Mobility adds a spontaneity factor to potential mobilization, because 
users can react instantly and emotionally to events. Personalization is given through 
the typically person-to-person and social type of contact. Finally, the mobile phone is 
multimodal because it can transmit voice, images, and sounds, making it a tool for 
live transmission of events to be shared on the network with the implications that 
follow from such ‘broadcasting’ (Castells et al. 2007:211). These aspects can 
potentially turn mobile phones into indispensable tactical and organizational tools for 
any group or organization that wishes to mobilize people around a common cause. At 
the same time, systematic governmental countermeasures against this type of use do 
not appear to be common and of little concern compared to the large economic 
benefits of mobile telecommunications (cf. Miard 2008). The case studies and 
interviews in Ch. 2 present a forceful body of evidence that further research should be 
done. 
This paper is meant to shed light on the mobile phones capability as a facilitator. As 
the reader will notice further below, the view that this device has the potential to, 
                                              
6 The state of disconnection is not always a matter of poverty and thus demand; in the case of East Africa, for 
example, it is a technical and infrastructural problem. The absence of a land-based fiber-optic backbone access 
to the world’s data grid requires expensive and bandwidth-weak satellite connections (cf. Tusubira et al. 
2005:166-168). While Western Africa already has an undersea fiber-optic cable, one along the East African 
coast remains an unfinished project. See www.eassy.org for more details. 
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among other things, facilitate collective action or the mobilization of large masses of 
people for political aims will be the leitmotif of this work.  
1.2 The state of mobile telecommunications in the world 
In the last decade, the world has witnessed very high telecommunications investments 
in almost every country. More than half of these global investments in 2004 were 
made outside of the OECD (ITU 2006:9). Why is this happening? Universal demand, 
falling costs and a profitable, competitive market appear to be the driving forces 
behind this phenomenon. In fact, as The Economist (2006a) notes, foreign and home-
grown mobile network operators have “worked out how to earn princely sums in the 
world’s poorest places” and are fiercely competing for market share, pouring in large 
sums of investment in many countries. Mobile telephony on a worldwide scale 
belongs to the most competitive sectors in business (ITU 2006:5). 
Fig. 1.2 Global comparison of mobile phone growth 
Source: ITU 2007 
After swift growth throughout Europe, and to a lesser degree in North America, 
mobile phone networks have recently been growing at very fast rates in the 
developing world, with Africa as the front-runner (cf. Vodafone 2005). As figure 1.2 
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indicates, the annual rate of deployment has been phenomenal. At the same time, due 
to technical and structural reasons, the use of the Internet and computers in general is 
still very limited in many less developed parts of this world (see table G.1 in the 
appendix). Mobile technology, owing to its unique characteristics, is able to bypass 
the structural problems that inhibit the Internet in less developed countries.  
The mobile phone is […] a wonderful example of a ‘leapfrog’ technology: it has enabled 
developing countries to skip the fixed-line technology of the 20th century and move 
straight to the mobile technology of the 21st” (Economist 2008a). 
This is an exception; most new technologies – the Internet and PCs are good 
examples – depend on existing infrastructure such as roads, electricity and fixed 
phone lines in order to work. In other words, “to go high-tech, you need to have gone 
medium-tech first” (Economist 2008a). If there is no reliable source of electricity, 
there is no point in having a computer or a fridge. A mobile phone, however, does not 
need a steady, local source of electricity but can instead be recharged occasionally. 
Neither is it dependent on existing fixed phone lines as the Internet is. The threshold 
for its use is also lower by other terms: phones can be operated by users with no or 
Fig. 1.3 Comparing subscription type in Africa 
Source: ITU 2007 
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minimal levels of literacy. The same cannot be said about computers (Dholakia and 
Kshetri 2003:248). This is an important factor in less developed countries with high 
illiteracy levels, and together with other factors, it explains mobile phone 
technology’s swift success in connecting people. This happens also in very isolated 
places where no one would have even dreamed of these new possibilities a few years 
ago. The case of Africa is a good example for this. Infamous for extremely low 
penetration of telecommunication services, it has recently been able to greatly profit 
from the mobile phone’s unique ‘leapfrogging’ abilities. Fig. 1.3 illustrates Africa’s 
immense mobile telephony breakthrough compared to traditional fixed telephony. 
More importantly, civil society in developing countries is making use of the new tool, 
particularly its cheap and practical text messaging function. Although most mobile 
phone activity remains within, and relates to, the circle of family, friends, and 
business associates, it is at times being used more strategically for mass mobilization. 
An example is the call for nation-wide boycotts that is mass-transmitted via SMS7, a 
phenomenon that, for example, has taken place in Nigeria (Obadare 2006) and China 
(NZZ 2008b). And as the following chapters will show, the combination of quick 
communication and large, angry masses of people can have consequences political 
leaders should be wary of. 
1.3 Research question and approach 
The bottom-line question of this thesis is to find out what the proliferation of mobile 
phones, a trend observable in almost every country, means for the political sphere. 
Can a few calls and text messages really challenge the established powers? Will it be 
easier to mobilize a large number of people for street protests and other forms of what 
can be called political activism? Will civil society become better organized and more 
effective vis-à-vis the state? Can mobile network growth be associated with increased 
political activism? Is there really any effect at all? I pose these questions because of 
the phenomenon of rapid growth of mobile phone usage worldwide in conjunction 
with a number of events where, perhaps too enthusiastically, the use of mobile 
                                              
7 Short Message Service, a communications protocol to exchange text messages between mobile phones. 
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phones has been given credit for the outcomes of protest activities that were directed 
against governments. 
I will tackle this question through three avenues: First, I will review and discuss three 
case studies which describe the phenomenon I intend to study (Ch. 2). For further 
illustration, I will add two interviews I conducted with key informants. Next, I will 
look into the theoretical literature (Ch. 3). Are there any models with explanatory 
claims in the field that are of interest here? Out of this I will develop a proper 
hypothesis that is to be tested with statistical methods in what consists of the third 
part (Ch. 4 and 5).  
Tackling the question in this manner evidently requires the use of two different 
methodological approaches, a qualitative and a quantitative one.8 This combined 
procedure is increasingly recognized in the social sciences, and often applied in 
cooperative research where specialists in either field work together. Combining the 
two has great potential for true and comprehensive analysis, as they complement one 
another (Read and Marsh 2002; George and Bennett 2005:34-35). Consider the 
procedure to deal with the general question in this paper, which can be formulated as 
follows: “Do mobile phones have an effect on political activism?” According to 
Mahoney and Goertz (2006), a qualitative researcher, in line with the norms of his or 
her academic tradition, would reformulate this into: “Did mobile phones have an 
effect on political activism in one or more particular cases?” A quantitative 
researcher, on the other hand, would translate the question into: “What is the average 
effect of mobile phones on political activism?” Both approaches are of high value and 
ideally, an “explanation of an outcome in one or a small number of cases leads one to 
wonder if the same factors are at work when a broader understanding of scope is 
adopted, stimulating a larger-N analysis in which the goal is less to explain particular 
cases and more to estimate the average effects” (Mahoney and Goertz 2006:231). 
Using qualitative studies and extending the analysis to a larger number of countries is 
precisely the purpose of this thesis. 
                                              
8 Bennett (2002) prefers to distinguish between case studies, formal modeling, and statistics rather than 
between approaches termed ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’. The collective action literature I partly use to 
develop my hypothesis (Ch. 3.4) could be characterized as a formal model. 
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2. Smart Mobs and the State: Some Examples 
Why have I come to study the issue of mobile phones’ impact on society? For one, I 
have repeatedly noticed reports of a rather anecdotal value in a range of news 
outlets.9 This has led me to study this question from various angles and along this I 
have come across a number of remarkable case studies. A very illustrative case is the 
so-called People Power II revolution in the Philippines in 2001. After a few 
introductory remarks, it will be briefly described below. 
                                             
 
As Castells et al. (2007:185) note, mobile communication networks can be formed 
and reformed instantly, and messages are often received by a known source, 
enhancing their credibility. At the same time, such networks provide a powerful 
platform for political autonomy on the basis of independent channels of autonomous 
person-to-person communication. 
“The networking logic of the communication process makes [the mobile phone] a high-
volume communication channel, but with a considerable  degree of personalization and 
interactivity [while] the wide availability of individually controlled [mobile] 
communication effectively bypasses the mass-media system as a source of information” 
(Castells et al. 2007:185).  
 
In their book Mobile Communication and Society (Castells et al. 2007), the authors 
observe a growing tendency for people to use mobile communication to voice their 
discontent with their country’s authorities and to mobilize protesters by inducing 
‘flash mobilizations’.10 Such mobilizations are thought to have “made a considerable 
impact on formal politics and government decisions” in a number of instances 
(2007:185). In this paper, I will repeatedly draw from this qualitative study that was 
initiated by the Annenberg Research Network on International Communication at the 
 
9 The Economist has been a particularly reliable news source, often enthusiastically heralding the social and 
economical effects of mobile phones. Searching www.economist.com with the keyword mobile 
telecommunications produces a plethora of articles.  
10 ‘Flash mobs’ originally consisted of a large group of people who assembled suddenly in a public place 
performed an unusual action for a brief time and then quickly dispersed. Some authors seem to be using this 
term in the wider sense of large demonstrations that rely on communication technology, and are not necessarily 
very short in duration. For such events, the term ‘smart mobs’ may be more adequate (cf. Nicholson 2005; 
Rheingold 2002). 
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University of Southern California. It is to my knowledge the most comprehensive and 
up-to-date work on the social impact of mobile phones available. 
2.1 Philippines, 2001: Impeachment 
This event is probably the most famous example of civil society action relying on the 
use of mobile phones; its fame is partly due to Howard Rheingold’s book Smart Mobs 
(2002) and an article by Rafael Vicente in 2003.11 It is often, but probably 
incorrectly, considered the first time in history that the mobile phone played an 
instrumental role in removing the ruling president of a state (Castells et al. 
007:186).12 
ed ‘instructions’ received via their mobile phones (Castells et al. 2007:186-
87). 
                                             
2
 
Joseph Estrada, a former senator and movie star, was sworn in as president of the 
Republic of the Philippines in 1998. By 2000, he had become increasingly unpopular 
outside of his core constituency that mostly consisted of low-income farmers and 
people from the poorest strata of Filipino society. Estrada became subject to 
numerous allegations of corruption and mismanagement, and in October 2000, 
opposition groups finally filed an impeachment complaint with the House of 
Representatives against him. By December, the Senate impeachment trial had 
formally begun. However, at a critical meeting in January 2001, senators voted 11-10 
against opening an envelope that was believed to contain records of Estrada’s secret 
transactions. Within hours enraged residents of the capital, Manila, gathered in the 
streets to protest against what was perceived as injustice. Many of the protesters 
follow
1
 
The massive demonstrations of ‘People Power II’, as this demonstration was dubbed, 
lasted for four days, from January 16 to 20.13 Growing street pressure led most key 
 
11 Rheingold set up a website collecting news on the smart use of ICT, see www.smartmobs.org.  
12 My interview with Ivan Marovic (2008) suggests that an earlier event of this type may have happened in 
Serbia in 2000.  
13 Following the original ‘People Power’ movement that overthrew Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 (Castells et al. 
2007:268; cf. Rafael 2003:399). 
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cabinet members to abandon their posts. Eventually, the army sided with the 
protesters and Estrada was removed from office. By the end of the same day, the 
Supreme Court declared the presidency vacant, and the new president, Gloria Arroyo, 
as sworn in. People Power II concluded on a triumphant note (2007:187). 
 nearly doubled from on average of 25 million per day to 45 
million. (2007:188). 
2.2 Spain, 2004: Election hazard 
its widely accepted tough stand on Basque terrorism (Castells et al. 
007:198). 
kept blaming ETA, the Basque terror organization. This was 
perfectly rational: 
to Spaniards the high price they were paying for their government’s policy in Iraq, thus 
potentially inciting them to vote against the government” (Castells et al. 2007:198-199) 
w
 
News coverage invariably highlighted the role of new communication technologies, 
particularly SMS and the web, in facilitating and enabling the protests. Indeed, it was 
texting that made the swift gathering of tens of thousands possible immediately after 
the crucial vote of the senate. The demonstrators were using SMS so actively that 
during the week of the protests it “caused serious strain on the networks” that covered 
the protest area: Globe Telecom, an operator, reported a massive increase of SMS 
traffic: The numbers
On March 11, 2004, an Al-Qaeda cell killed 192 commuters in Madrid by blowing up 
bombs inside three trains. The attack took place just four days prior to Spain’s 
national elections. Incidentally, these elections were dominated by the debate about 
Spain participating in the Iraq War. Despite broad opposition to the war, the ruling 
Conservative Party (PP) was expected to win the elections based on its economic 
record and 
2
 
Immediately after the terror attack, the PP stated that Basque terrorists were to blame. 
Subsequently, it became clear that Al-Qaeda was more likely to be responsible. 
However, the PP 
 “In political terms, making the Basque terrorists responsible would favor the PP in the 
elections, while acknowledging the action to be that of Islamic terrorists would indicate 
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An inquiry commission later produced evidence that the PP had, at the very least, 
deliberately delayed information and presented as proof some elements that were still 
under scrutiny (2007:199). Regardless of the true extent of deception, thousands of 
Spaniards were convinced that the government was manipulating facts, and they 
started to disseminate their views to other citizens. At the same time, the major TV 
channels, all of them directly or indirectly controlled by the government, and most 
radio stations supported the Basque terrorist hypothesis. The print media followed 
suit, after the Prime Minister had personally called editors of the main press 
publications to reassure them (2007:199). 
 
With most of the traditional media sticking to one version, oppositional views had to 
turn to alternative communication channels to spread their version of the truth. The 
use of such channels led to mobilizations against the Conservative Party on the day 
prior to Election Day, when political demonstrations are, in fact, prohibited according 
to Spanish law.  This apparently made an impact – more young voters participated 
and about one million voters switched sides to punish the PP for its perceived 
manipulation of information and its policy in Iraq. The Socialist Party then clearly 
beat the PP in the polls (Castells et al. 2007:199). The crucial aspect was the youth’s 
participation. Usually characterized by high abstention rates, they became politicized 
by these events. Indeed, “individuals without political affiliation, and independent of 
mainstream parties, began to circulate text messages to the addresses programmed 
into their cell phones” (2007:200), calling for a demonstration for the truth in front of 
the PP building in Madrid and in other cities. In the meantime, Spanish TV stuck to 
the Basque terrorism version. On the evening before election, in a rather clearly 
biased move, one major TV station even changed the regular program to broadcast a 
documentary about the assassination of a politician by Basque terrorists (2007:200). 
 
SMS traffic increased by 20 percent over the average on Saturday, and by 40 percent 
on Sunday, an all-time record. As Castells et al. (2007:201) note, the critical point 
was that the senders were known to the receivers, making the network of diffusion 
increase exponentially while retaining proximity to the source. Major television 
 20
channels and newspapers were soon ignored as reliable sources, but the major private 
radio network SER eventually started to look for the alternative Al-Qaeda 
explanation. Consequently, many activists referred to the SER when calling or texting 
their friends (2007:201). 
 
The critical event was the Saturday demonstration, a typical ‘smart mob’ (cf. 
Rheingold 2002) phenomenon of mobile-phone enhanced protesters “prompted by a 
massive network of SMS that increased the effect of communication exponentially 
through interpersonal channels” (Castells et al. 2007:202). The authors conclude that 
in the end, this contributed to altering the outcome of the national elections in Spain. 
2.3 China, 2003: Epidemic 
The SARS14 outbreak in China in 2003 illustrates a case of civil society’s use of 
mobile phones that was unsuccessful in terms of mobilization. At the beginning of the 
epidemic, no news media or Internet outlets reported on the event. Victims and their 
friends and families, however, began to send SMSes regarding this strange, deadly 
disease.  The ‘word of mouth’ spread quickly in Guangdong’s urban areas and then 
outside the province. At that point, the Chinese public hygiene and propaganda 
authorities launched a mass-media campaign to counter these ‘rumors’. In the 
campaign, they downplayed the severity of the disease, claiming that it was just a 
variant of pneumonia. They also declared that everything was under control, and that 
the public and partly SMS-induced panic was groundless (2007:207). 
 
Castells et al. (2007:207) note that in contrast to the Spanish case, traditional media 
seems to have effectively undermined the earlier information dispersed by mobile 
phones “because SMS was perceived to be a medium of lower credibility and there 
was no other source of information”. Most people, Chinese and foreigners alike, 
                                              
14 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. 
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“chose to believe the official version, only to witness the SARS epidemic in full 
swing within weeks” (2007:207).15 
2.4 Discussion 
It is clear that the outcomes of the events presented above were strongly shaped by 
context, and that the mobile phones’ facilitating aspect worked most likely in 
conjunction with many other factors. Castells and his co-authors do not deny this, and 
neither is it my point to give mobile phones too much credit for what happened. What 
is of interest here is a certain pattern, where mobile phones repeatedly showed their 
potential in shaping and facilitating the development of mass events. At the same 
time, the true effect of the mobile phone alone remains unclear and further analysis is 
needed to clarify this question; quantitative analysis may be able to do this. 
 
Events similar to the ones above are being reported from all over the world and they 
usually fall into two categories: mobile phones are either used for monitoring or 
reporting; or they are used for mobilization and collective action. In the former, it 
usually takes place at polling stations: voting results are transmitted to radio stations 
at once, making the opportunity to rig results considerably more difficult (Economist 
2008b). Countries where such monitoring has taken place are for example, Senegal 
(Abel 2000) and more recently, Zimbabwe (Global Voices 2008; Martz 2008). For 
the second category, where mobile phones have been used for mobilization and 
collective action, we have already seen some examples above. My analyses will focus 
on this, as it will be subsequently shown. 
                                              
15 Castells et al. are very pessimistic with regard to the mobile phone’s impact in China due to the  unparalleled 
levels of resources and skills the Chinese government is supposedly using to deal with this type of activity, and 
because China has an authoritarian political system which is “fundamentally at odds with grassroots 
mobilization” (Castells et al. 2007:207). This may be an underestimation of Chinese activists and the 
developments of civil society in China in recent years. The use of Twitter may serve as an example: Twitter is a 
popular public instant-messaging feed that delivers information faster than censors can block it. This new 
combined use of the Internet and mobile phones seems to give Chinese authorities a headache (cf. Wall Street 
Journal 2008; Aftenposten 2008). Twitter functions like a public blog, but contents are posted via SMS. See 
www.twitter.com.  
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2.5 Interviews with key informants 
For the purpose of this paper I did go beyond just reproducing the works from other 
scholars and news reports. To gain additional insight in the practical use, or ‘street 
use’ of mobile phones, I interviewed two key informants. The first, Ivan Marovic, is a 
former leading member of Otpor, a Serbian opposition movement, who now lives and 
works in Washington DC. The other, Pavel Marozau, is a Belarusian dissident, 
currently living in exile for his media activism and involvement in an opposition 
movement called Third Way (2008).16 I will summarize some key insights from the 
interviews below. The complete interviews are available in the appendix. 
2.5.1 Otpor and Serbia, 2000: Bringing down Milosevic 
“[T]he most important [situation] was the march from Novi Sad to Belgrade on April 
14th, 2000. That was a demo[nstration] 100 percent operated through mobile phones” 
(Marovic 2008 [interview]). 
 
Originally a student movement, Otpor, which means ‘resistance’, turned political 
after the NATO bombings in Serbia in 1998, waging a political campaign against 
Slobodan Milosevic. The campaign eventually led to a successful outcome, Milosevic 
stepped down and was later extradited to The Hague for trial. Otpor’s use of cell 
phones in their activities was reported by Radio Free Europe (2005) in response to the 
Orange Revolution in the Ukraine. Ukrainian activists were said to follow a path 
“already forged by the Serbian youth movement Otpor, whose members used coded 
short-text messaging on cell phones to coordinate their actions” (Radio Free Europe 
2005). There is little material on this otherwise (cf. Walker 2006:18-19). 
 
In the interview, Ivan Marovic, responsible for press and PR at Otpor during the 
events in 2000, and one of the founding members, unequivocally confirmed the 
importance of mobile phones in this movement. A particularly interesting aspect that 
surfaced in the interview was the fact that the Internet played a rather limited role 
                                              
16  Due to frequent hacker attacks, the website (see reference chapter) may not be always available. 
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because the Web was slow and not used a lot in Serbia in 2000.17 Mobile phones, on 
the other hand, where very common according to Marovic: “[By] 2000, almost 
everybody had a mobile”. While the Internet was used for strategic communication – 
news, documents, etc. – the mobile phone was crucial for operational and tactical 
communication. For example, in order to transport small packages from one place to 
another, they would ask bus drivers to deliver these and immediately text or call the 
receiving party in the other town to pick up the deliveries. Marovic stated that cell 
phones were crucial for such operations. 
 
Marovic also gave an example of mobile use where changing tasks in real time was 
critical: in a long march from Novi Sad to Belgrade in April 2000, the organizers had 
to coordinate tasks while walking. Food had to be delivered, supplied by volunteers 
from different towns. They also had to organize buses for those who could not walk 
anymore (the distance between those two large Serbian cities is 80km). Last but not 
least, the welcome rally and press releases upon arrival in Belgrade needed to be 
prepared and coordinated. Marovic used up three cell phone batteries that night.  
 
Ivan Marovic confirmed some of my assumptions with regard to the relevance of 
mobile phones in immediate street action and mass mobilization. He also managed to 
highlight the aspect of logistics and how it can rely on mobile phone usage, which 
was partly novel to me. Otpor’s heydays now date a few years back and 
communication technologies have undergone rapid changes since 2000. To gain 
insight into a more recent situation, an additional interview was performed with a 
media activist from Belarus, a country that has yet to experience freedom of speech. 
                                              
17 In fact, Marovic later told me that he had feared too many questions about the Internet, only to discover, to 
his delight, that someone was finally interested in mobile phones. Earlier scholars had interviewed him with a 
focus on the role of the Internet, which he had little to say about. 
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2.5.2 Third Way and Belarus, 2008: Lukashenka’s police state 
“[M]obilization is not only about political conversations. It is about normal 
communications with people, involving them in activities” (Marozau 2008 [interview]). 
Two years ago, Pavel Marozau left Belarus to evade his own arrest by Belarusian 
authorities. The activists behind Third Way, an independent youth group, had just 
been charged with ‘insulting’ the president. In Belarus, this automatically means a 
guilty verdict, as President Lukashenka18 heads a Soviet-style police state. Pavel 
Marozau, who is in charge of the publication of anti-Lukashenka cartoons, was one of 
the last Third Way activists to still be in the country; all others had already left 
earlier. He has now found asylum in Estonia (Charter’97 2006). Third Way is much 
more than just a cartoonist’s website; their goal is nothing less than reforming and 
modernizing Belarusian society (Third Way 2008). Mission objectives are listed on 
their website, where one can also find specified tactical priorities such as up-to-date 
and safe communication and effective mobilization, two aspects that relate to my 
work. It is Third Way’s active use of the newest communication technologies in a 
hostile environment that prompted me to interview Pavel Marozau in the first place. 
Government surveillance appears to be an overall issue in the case of Belarus, as is 
the need for safe communication. Pavel Marozau agrees that mobile phones are very 
important for his organization’s activities. However, he also adds that where possible, 
the use of mobile phones is being avoided for ‘serious things’. Mobile 
communication can be very unsafe; interception by state authorities is especially 
common in the run-up phase to state elections. All Belarusian mobile network 
operators are under state control; no private company can own more than 49 percent 
of the shares (this has, however, been relaxed recently). It is very difficult, if not 
impossible, for mobile network operators to refuse to comply with requests for 
sensitive personal information by Belarusian authorities, such as calls, SMSes, etc. 
“[M]obiles are good during opposition actions for operative coordination and reporting 
to media and say[ing] for example that you’ve been arrested” (Marozau 2008 
[interview]). 
                                              
18 I use the Belarusian transliteration here. The often used ‘Lukashenko’ is a Russian transliteration. 
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Third Way has been using mobile phones to contact potential new recruits, but also 
for operative coordination, or media reporting — for example upon having been 
arrested. In the case of operative coordination, it is important to use coded language 
or not name places while talking on a mobile phone. Marozau describes a situation 
where he accidentally slipped the name of a public square while talking to an activist 
on his mobile phone. The consequence was swift: his fellow activist was arrested 
within 15 minutes.  
Another tactical strategy is to use reconnaissance activists in street demonstrations 
who report police movement, especially the crowd-control units called OMON. To do 
this, the reconnaissance activists use ‘clean’ mobile phones with SIM19 cards and 
phone IDs that have not yet been registered by the surveillance apparatus.20  
Mass SMS sending has also been used to mobilize Belarusians, with messages such 
as “People, come to October Square on 1st of September. Zhive Belarus!”21 Public 
expression of political opinion is, however, very difficult in Belarus. Police forces 
and secret service units usually quickly quash such attempts. Youth groups even 
revert to unusual ideas to gain attention while making it difficult for the government 
to justify counteraction, as for example in a ‘flash mob’ of young people doing 
nothing else than gathering publicly to eat ice cream (Rheingold 2006). 
The Belarusian authorities are, of course, not foolish. Marozau explained in the 
interview how they are well aware of the power of mass SMS and have made use of it 
themselves, especially prior to the presidential elections or the 2004 referendum. 
They routinely modify the opposition’s messages, or just spread the opposite 
message. The Belarusian government has also created its own, well-funded youth 
                                              
19 SIM stands for Subscriber Identity Module; these small smart cards are used to identify subscribers to mobile 
and data networks. 
20 In order to do this, neutral people (as far away from the opposition activists) are asked to subscribe to up to 5 
or 10 mobile phone contracts, providing them with the equal number of ’fresh’ SIM cards. Only recently have 
pre-paid cards been introduced in Belarus, somewhat simplifying this process. Phone identification numbers 
(IDs) can also be registered; Marozau pointed out that activists therefore occasionally reload their handsets’ 
software using illegal Russian hacker software. 
21 According to Marozau,  the mobile phone numbers of around 1 million subscribers of the Belarusian operator 
Velcom were put on the web by hackers – twice so within a short period of time. This certainly helped for 
mass-sending SMS, but it was due to exceptional circumstances. Sending mass SMSes to random numbers 
would be another feasible strategy; Marozau did, however, dismiss it as being too expensive. 
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organization called BRSM. It also uses mass SMSes and other communication 
strategies, thus copying the opposition movement’s tactics. 
When asking Pavel Marozau about mobile phones as facilitators of logistics, he 
concurred that it could sometimes be useful, but that Third Way limited their use for 
safety reasons. In addition to tapped phone calls, there is also the risk of localization; 
with today’s technology, it is possible to localize the position of a mobile phone and 
thus its user even when the handset is not being used. The accuracy is 50-100 meters, 
according to Marozau. It has become common to simply switch off the phone or even 
remove the battery to be on the safe side. 
Interview conclusions 
While only a limited comparison with the Serbian case was attempted, one noticeable 
change between the two seems to be safety concerns. Although Ivan Marovic briefly 
mentioned some concern in the interview – for example, taking the battery out of 
mobile phones was already an issue for some Otpor activists – it did not appear to be 
such a major concern compared to today’s activists in Belarus. They seem to be much 
more concerned about safety than the young activists in Serbia were a few years 
earlier. It appears that government agencies have stepped up their know-how in 
dealing with mobile telecommunications as a security risk, both technically and 
tactically. Today’s activists appear to be reluctant to rely too much on this single 
technology; on the other hand, with the evolution of the Internet including cheap, 
encrypted Internet telephony (Voice over IP, such as Skype), they have also more 
alternatives than Ivan Marovic and his fellow activists had in 2000, when access to 
the Internet was rare in Serbia and still relied on slow dial-up connections. The 
Belarusian setting seems to reflect the situation in more developed nations, while 
Serbia in 2000 may rather resemble today’s less developed countries with limited 
Internet access availability as discussed in the introduction chapter above. 
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3. The Theoretical Framework 
Up to this point, I have discussed empirical findings by other researchers as well as 
the results of my own interviews. I conclude that there is clearly some evidence to 
suggest a connection between political activism and the use of mobile phones by 
activists. I now turn to the theoretical framework. Are there any theories that can be 
used to explain such a connection? A number of potentially useful theories in this 
matter deal with collective action and mobilization, and more particularly with social 
movement issues. It seems that there are theories that would explain the impact of 
mobile phones and other telecommunication devices implicitly, while it is still too 
new a field to find explicit models that deal directly and more than just tentatively 
with mobile phone technology and its impact on political activism. This can be 
contrasted with more advanced research on the Internet (Garrett 2006:203). I 
therefore need to introduce mobile telecommunication technology within existing 
theory and further develop it. Leading sociologists such as Manuel Castells have 
recognized the importance of this question: 
“Because communication is at the heart of human activity in all spheres of life, the 
advent of [mobile telecommunication] technology, allowing multimodal communication 
from anywhere to anywhere where there is appropriate infrastructure, raises a wide 
range of fundamental questions” (Castells et al. 2007:1). 
 
Mobile connectivity can be said to both reflect and intensify social ties: without 
social ties, the mobile phone, predominantly used for social contact with friends and 
family members, is of little use. At the same time, it is a powerful tool to manage or 
‘microcoordinate’ one’s social life and keep in touch with one’s social network, and 
one that can be used to strengthen and expand social ties (cf. Ling 2004; Livesay 
2003:196). 
The concept of social ties and how mobile telecommunications is affecting these will 
be a recurrent theme below. In order to understand how this aspect can be 
incorporated into existing theory, I will first introduce a variant of collective action 
theory (Ch. 3.1.1). This will mainly highlight individual motives to participate the 
activities and movements of interest here. Next, I will draw from mobilization and 
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diffusion theory to further emphasize structural aspects of how political and social 
movements are generated. These are partly implied in the section on collective action, 
but are in need of further elaboration (Ch. 3.1.2). Finally, network society theory will 
link the previous theories to technology both conceptually (Castells 2000a and 
2000b) and more conclusively where the theory is used in connection with mobile 
telecommunications (Castells et al. 2007). This will be further developed into my 
argument in Chapter 3.3 and 3.4 where a hypothesis based on the theoretical and 
empirical findings (see Ch. 2) will be formulated. 
3.1 Networks, social ties and collective action 
In the study of social movements in general and collective action in particular, 
networks and the way they connect and empower actors play an important role. The 
literature is vast (see for example: Snow et al. 2004 or Melucci 1996), and 
consequently, I draw from manifold different sources in this chapter. Altogether, I 
base my approach most notably on the collective action and network theory rationales 
introduced by Gould (1993) and Castells (2000a and 2000b), completing it with some 
aspects from mobilization and diffusion theory. 
3.1.1 Collective Action 
Roger Gould (1993 and 1995) attempts to introduce the element of social ties into 
collective action theory in a formal way. His reasoning resonates well with the point 
of my argument. Gould (1993) states that if at least one actor has already made a 
contribution to a cause, other actors have two reasons to make contributions of their 
own. One is instrumental, i.e. based on how one perceives the efficacy of a cause. 
The other is normative, i.e. based on how one fears, or wishes, to be perceived by 
others. Neither reason accomplishes much by itself: Normative pressure to contribute 
to collective action will have little impact if elicited contributions are completely 
wasted, while increasing marginal returns will only reinforce the waiting game and 
encourage free-riding in the absence of fairness norms (Gould 1993:182).  
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Social ties, as he argues, “occupy a central role in explanations of how groups 
overcome the free-rider problem” (Gould 1993:182). The role that networks of social 
relations plays in recruitment and mobilization, as opposed to the idea of ‘random 
contagion’, has been recognized in the respective literature (cf. Soule 1997 and 
2004). Underlying this is the recognition that “social ties make individual’s decisions 
about participating in collective action interdependent” (Gould 1993:182; emphasis 
added; see also Kim and Bearman 1997). A basic tenet of Mancur Olson’s (1965, 
cited in Gould 1993:182) characterization of the free-rider problem is that “a rational 
actor will abstain from contributing to a public good if his or her contribution has a 
negligible impact on the total amount of the good produced and consequently a 
negligible impact on his or her consumption of the good”. But if these decisions are 
not independent, i.e. if one actor’s contribution makes another actor’s contribution 
more likely, the total benefit resulting from an individual’s decision to contribute may 
be considerably greater than his or her cost of contributing (Gould 1993:182). 
Introducing a normative element makes sense because as Gould states, “few social 
scientists believe that individuals are pure rational egoists, particularly since 
collective action occurs more frequently than the rational choice framework would 
predict” (1993:183).  
By relaxing the rational-choice assumption that individuals are pure utility 
maximizers, it is possible to account for the event of collective action in the absence 
of formal sanctioning mechanisms (e.g. punishment) while introducing fairness 
norms and efficacy expectations as central contributors to the production of collective 
goods. Both aspects are important: “People may be perfectly willing to contribute 
something to a collective good, but unless they are reasonably sure their contributions 
will not be wasted, they will wait and see what others do” (Gould 1993:183-184). If 
some individuals take the initiative, it will increase the motivation of others to join in 
because the initiators have increased the marginal returns to the group that would 
arise from further contributions.22 Any utility maximizer would still try to get a free 
                                              
22 Gould uses ‘Maple Street’, a fictitious neighborhood, to illustrate this point. The public good in question is 
overall cleanliness: If one person has already picked up some trash littering the street, the marginal return from 
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ride here; however, in the presence of norms of fairness, everyone with social ties to 
the initiators now has a reason to match the initiators’ contribution. “As much as 
people dislike being exploited, they do not want to be perceived, and potentially 
ostracized, as exploitative” (1993:184). Stated more positively, “seeing others 
contribute should motivate actors to contribute their share” (1993:184).23  
In general, one can say that the degree to which contributions are visible affects the 
level of normative social pressure non-contributors may be subjected to, thus altering 
their behavior (Gould 1993:184). This aspect of visibility needs to be emphasized at 
this point, because I will argue for enhanced visibility through mobile phone usage. 
From a theoretical point of view the concept of visibility in my context represents the 
collective, public demonstration of activists confronting political authority on specific 
grounds (Livesay 2003:197; Melucci 1994:127). Visible action such as the waves of 
mass SMSes described in Chapter 2 “strengthens the hidden networks, boosts 
solidarity, creates further groups, and recruits new militants who, attracted by the 
movement’s public action, join its hidden networks” (Melucci 1994:127).24 Those 
hidden networks are the overlapping networks of small groups submerged in daily 
life. They make visible action possible because they provide the solidarity resources 
needed and the framework within which mobilization takes place (Melucci 1994:127; 
Livesay 2003:197), a factor that was also pointed out by Marozau (2008[interview]). 
I will return to this aspect later, tying this conceptually to mobile phones, assumed to 
be the carriers of increased and faster-spreading visibility. 
                                                                                                                                           
further cleaning increases because “every single discarded object now represents a greater percentage of the 
total remaining” (1993:184). 
23 Gould’s formal model also includes some boundary conditions not discussed here; see Gould (1993:185). 
The question of ‘centrality’ and ‘network flow’ can also be important; these issues relate to the position of 
nodes (e.g. a person) within a network as well the way any type of ‘traffic’ flows through the network. For 
example, a mass-SMS forwarded by an opposition movement leader (a central node) may have a different 
effect than an identical SMS passed on by a newly recruited street activist. Information diffusion can also be 
affected by how a movement and the underlying social network are organized structurally. For further 
consideration of these particular questions, see Borgatti (2005) and Gould (1993:194). 
24 Gould (1991, cited in Livesay 2003:196) makes a similar point by saying that “mobilization does not just 
depend on social ties; it also creates them.”  
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3.1.2 Mobilization and Diffusion 
Mobilization theory and diffusion theory appear to be two close relatives to Gould’s 
approach, and a fertile ground for my work because they further emphasize structural 
aspects that facilitate mobilization for collective action. Mobilization theorists’ 
recognition of the need for a ‘multifactored’ approach to the problem of movement 
formation is particularly relevant (cf. Jenkins 1983; Buechler 2008). The idea of 
thresholds is critical; resources, organization, opportunity and grievances must be 
present25 simultaneously at their threshold levels before a movement emerges, though 
deficits in some dimensions may be offset by surpluses in others (Jenkins 1983:532). 
This latter argument is particularly useful in the present case, as one can argue that 
mobile phones may create a surplus in, say, organization and resources. They do this 
not necessarily through the total amount of skill or resources available, but rather 
through more efficient use of these factors.26 For instance, the real-time aspect of 
mobile communication means that people, supplies, and money can be reallocated or 
redirected while a process is under way (Townsend 2000:98; Kwan 2007:437-438). 
This can be particularly effective in protest movements, e.g. in street demonstrations 
where protesters can quickly adapt to police movement, arrests and blockades by 
spreading information about them and immediately acting on it (cf. Rheingold 
2002:158; Castells et al. 2007:203-204). Indeed, the increase in reallocatable 
discretionary resources such as time and money is absolutely central to the expansion 
of a social movement (Livesay 2003:199-200). Gould’s normative argument is also 
reflected in Robert Putnam’s concept of social capital, or ‘networks of civic 
engagement’ that can encourage and facilitate collective action “through the 
production of trust and norms of generalized reciprocity” (Putnam 1993, cited in 
Livesay 2003:195; cf. also Diani 2004).  
Furthermore, within mobilization theory, the subcategory of micromobilization 
relates to the concept of Melucci’s hidden networks mentioned earlier. 
                                              
25 Buechler (2008:8) also suggests that the combined effects of organization and grievances, i.e. strong social 
ties and the event of breakdown of everyday routines, respectively, may be most likely to promote collective 
action. This perspective can be related to information cascade theory (cf. Chapter 3.2) and to Kuran (1989). 
26 For a useful graphic overview of social movement dimensions and factors, see Norris (2002:20). 
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Micromobilization is defined as “that small group setting in which processes of 
collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to 
produce mobilization for collective action” (McAdam 1988, cited in Livesay 
2003:200). It can be provided by non-political and informal groups such as friendship 
networks. Such contexts can be generative of social movements for a variety of 
reasons. Such dense social networks increase ‘structural proximity’, the proximity of 
more people to movement activity. Members of such networks are more likely to 
come in contact with movement activists and their flows of information. More 
importantly, this structural availability can operate both at the individual and group 
level. ‘Bloc recruitment’, i.e. on group rather than individual basis, thus becomes 
possible (Livesay 2003:200). Such ‘blocs’ can, in turn, increase group solidarity. 
Equally important is that micromobilization contexts make certain psychological 
processes27 that facilitate movement participation more likely. These are for example, 
as Livesay (2003:201) notes, the “delegitimation of hegemonic ideologies, the 
attribution of the causes of experienced grievances to structural rather than to 
individual factors, and the development of the perception of the efficacy of 
movement participation.” Social ties to movement supporters should increase the 
likelihood of one’s recruitment. Lastly, micromobilization contexts provide the 
rudiments of organization: Livesay (2003:201) mentions for example leaders and 
communication technologies. They are needed to translate contributions into concrete 
action. 
The two most facilitating features of pre-existing networks seem to be dense lateral 
ties, i.e. social integration, within the population of potential recruits as well as 
multiple bridging ties that link network clusters together (Livesay 2003:202). This 
insight is also shared by proponents of diffusion theory. This field focuses on the 
flows of information and ideas through various kinds of channels. As Soule 
(1997:860) notes, definitions of diffusion “almost always include the notion of 
connectedness” and in relational models of diffusion, information is said to be 
                                              
27 Timur Kuran (1989) has published some noteworthy models on psychological processes relevant to the onset 
of revolutions that elaborate on this aspect. It is related to the information cascades mentioned in Chapter 3.2. 
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flowing between actors through their direct network relations.28 This is an argument 
that seems to fit into this thesis, and Sarah Soule (2004) indeed repeatedly stresses the 
importance of networks to diffusion processes. Likewise, models used by network 
analysts reflect this in their claim that “ideas diffuse more rapidly when individuals 
are in direct and frequent contact”, i.e. where the interaction rate is high (Soule 
2004:295). Such an observation is certainly likely to be made among users of mobile 
phones, where texting and calling takes very little effort and time and can be done 
anywhere.  
3.1.3 Network Society Theory and Technology 
To incorporate the technological side of my enquiry, it is useful to consider the much-
cited works of Manuel Castells and his network society theory (Castells 2000a and 
2000b). He advocates a new ‘informational paradigm’ in society that rests upon 
information and communication technologies.29 Technology is not characterized as a 
determinist30 factor in Castells’ works; information and communication technologies 
are not portrayed as the cause of the transformations that initiated this new 
informational age, but they are an indispensable medium. Without computers and 
mobile phones, the workings of today’s social and economic sphere would probably 
look quite different. Furthermore, in this new informational age “all processes are 
enacted by organizational forms that are built upon networks” and particularly upon 
“information networks” (2000b:14-15).  
“While networks are old forms of social organization, they are now empowered by new 
information [and] communication technologies, so that they become able to cope at the 
same time with flexible decentralization, and with focused decision-making” (Castells 
2000b:5; emphasis added).  
 
Technology is, as he writes, a “specific layer of the social structure, following an old 
tradition in human ecology” (2000b:9) with which he implies that technology is 
                                              
28 She also points out certain types of diffusion that are observed between unconnected actors. Such non-
relational connections are referred to as ‘cultural linkages’. They are not further discussed here. For more on 
this, see Soule (1997:860-861; 2004:297-299). 
29 The new paradigm supposedly replaces the earlier industrial paradigm based on energy technology (Castells 
2000b:9). 
30 For an excellent theoretical discussion on technological determinism and different views on the ‘nature’ of 
technology, see Martin (2001:91-95). 
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omnipresent in our everyday lives. This is particularly true with mobile phones, 
which are highly personalized technological artifacts. Moreover, technology 
represents a “fundamental ingredient of human action – an action that ultimately 
produces and modifies social structure” (2000b:9). Mobile telecommunications 
technology can modify our social structure by creating what Cooper (2002:21) calls 
the “transparency of the world” where communication is possible anytime and 
anywhere, virtually eradicating “communication-free pockets”. The structural 
argument presented earlier can be encountered again here: In the sense that 
technology can enhance visibility, or transparency, one can also expect it to facilitate 
participation boosts in the political sphere, for example through feedback loops that 
intensify recruitment to political and social movements. 
The views of Castells and his colleagues on the specific impact of mobile 
telecommunication are of particular interest. Mobile telecommunications technology 
“critically affects spatiotemporal change” (Castells et al. 2007:171), i.e. the structural 
dimensions that otherwise restrain human action in both distance and time. The space 
of social interaction becomes redefined because mobile telecommunication changes 
the location reference – people are “here and there, in multiple heres and theres, in a 
relentless combination of places” (2007:172). The temporal dimension becomes 
redefined because individuals now do “midcourse adjustments” as they “walk or 
travel toward their destination while deciding which destination it is going to be. 
[They do this] on the basis of instant communication in which they are engaged” 
(Kwan 2007:437). This may be just as true in everyday life as in a street 
demonstration. Places now exist as “points of convergence in communication 
networks created and recreated by people’s purposes” (Castells et al. 2007:172; cf. 
also Kwan 2007:437-438; Ling 2004:69-75). This is exactly the effect I expect to 
work in favor of demonstrators. Communication technology is now shifting the 
possibilities from place-to-place towards person-to-person connectivity. Computers 
and telephones are traditionally tied to a fixed location; mobile telephones are not. 
Due to this phenomenon, it becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint when and 
where an activity begins (Kwan 2007:440-441). To relate this to an example: it is 
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harder to crack down on demonstrators who change plans and destinations on-the-go 
(Rheingold 2002:158).31 
The effects of technology are decisive in many realms, as it is a fundamental 
ingredient of human action with the ability to ultimately produce and modify social 
structure through power, production, family relationships and other means (Castells 
2000b:9). Certain innovations in weaponry, manufacturing, contraceptives and 
communication technology would be examples for this. The economical sphere can 
be particularly affected by technological change, and especially so if it touches 
network phenomena. Emily Chamlee-Wright for example, drawing from the works of 
Friedrich A. Hayek (1973, 1988, cited in Chamlee-Wright 2005:7-10), links such 
network phenomena, which she calls connectivity32, to mobile communications. New 
technologies allow people to make effective use of knowledge embedded within their 
local contexts because connectivity facilitates information dispersion and can thereby 
raise productivity and make business easier. This reflects the earlier diffusion theory 
arguments, along with Castell’s view that mobile technology empowers its users’ 
decision-making processes.33 
3.2 Conclusions and alternative approaches 
The theoretical arguments laid out in the previous chapter are concerned with issues 
of collective action and networking and seem to relate to the material presented in the 
empirical section. An example is the recruitment and mobilization for political causes 
by means of mass-SMS waves that call for protest participation. There are, of course, 
many other theories that can be used to frame these questions (cf. Norris 2002:19-25). 
However, in conjunction with the technological argument, the theories discussed 
above are considered the most relevant for the chosen research focus. 
                                              
31 Police may listen in and use spies to join the network that is exchanging such crucial information. The Battle 
of Seattle (cf. for example Rheingold 2002:158) is widely seen as an example where the police was unprepared. 
By 2004, however, they seem to have learned their lesson, dealing much more effectively with the same protest 
tactics at the Republican Party Convention in New York City. Part of their countertactics included 
eavesdropping on the messaging and web posting of the demonstrators (Castells et al. 2007:202-205). 
32 ’Connectivity’ will be used to describe the background concept underlying mobile phone usage (cf. Ch. 4.2). 
33 A famous example of this is the case of Indian fishermen who use mobile phones to find out where current 
demand and price for their fish is highest and, consequently, where to dock and sell their catch (Jensen 2007). 
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Two important issues, monitoring and logistics, were briefly discussed in Chapter 2.4 
and also clearly made apparent in the interviews in Chapter 2.5; such monitoring has 
also been reported in the Economist (2008b). These issues are, however, not really 
reflected in the theoretical literature discussed. This may be because they belong to 
strands of theories that are conceptually distinct from the ones used above, and 
covering them would be beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I would like to 
briefly address these two aspects for the sake of future research in this novel field, 
and also indicate some relevant alternative theories. 
Mobile phones and monitoring 
The aspect of monitoring could be covered by what Garret (2006:209) calls a 
“reversal of the Foucauldian panopticon”. In the traditional state, the elite controls 
power by surveillance techniques – a central mechanism that is to generate 
disciplinary self-regulation by the population. This is what Foucault (1977 and 1979, 
both cited in Garrett 2006 and Green 2002) describes with his panopticon. Modern 
information technologies can somewhat reverse this in today’s world. The public eye, 
enhanced by information technologies, can thus force the elite into self-regulated 
behavior. The cruder kinds of electoral fraud such as the stuffing of ballot boxes often 
rely on poor communications between the center and the periphery.34 They have now 
become much harder to carry out, because monitoring has become so cheap and 
effective that it can now more easily produce considerable embarrassment for 
fraudulent leaders.35 Foucault’s ideas and related works may provide a fruitful ground 
for conceptual and theoretical analysis of the monitoring issue raised above. 
Mobile phones and logistics 
Mobile phone utilization for logistical purposes relates to efficiency in a more 
economic sense as shortly introduced in the section on Chamlee-Wright’s work 
above. In this sense, technology reduces transaction costs of a certain activity, 
opening up new options and facilitating existing ones. One may argue that it does the 
                                              
34 There is often a time span between the casting of ballots and the publication of results, particularly when 
ballot boxes are first transported to a central office for counting. This is often used as an opportunity to 
manipulate results in favor of the incumbent rulers. 
35 “Even with minimal resources, monitors can count the voters and conduct exit polls – and then phone [or 
text] their findings to a radio station before the authorities stuff the ballot boxes” (Economist 2006b). 
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same in collective action. However, in collective action as in the variant introduced 
earlier, psychological and social processes are much more in focus than practical 
problems that may relate more to transaction costs. Examples are the clandestine 
shipping of packages from A to B, food delivery to marching demonstrators, or the 
cheap and efficient transmission of polling station results to a broadcasting station. 
The question of logistics may be better approached by strands of economic theory, 
and transaction cost issues may be useful to analyze the particularly restrictive 
conditions under which oppositionist movement operate. 
Information cascades 
An entirely different approach to decision-making that presents a useful alternative 
explanatory model for the topic of this work is the concept of information cascades. 
An information cascade takes place “when individuals acting in conditions of 
uncertainty strongly condition their choices on what others have done previously” 
(Drezner 2005:9). In repressive societies, such information cascades tend to reinforce 
acquiescent behavior by citizens. However, this cascade can be reversed by strong 
exogenous shocks that trigger acts of protest. It is not difficult to imagine what the 
omnipresence of mobile phones can do to boost such cascades. To understand how 
this theory can be used, see Drezner’s (2005) work on Internet usage in repressive 
societies. For the theoretical literature on information cascades, see Bikhchandani et 
al. (2007). 
The impact of technology in general 
Gould’s (1993 and 1995) approach takes into account networks and social ties to 
explain collective action. He does this in a logically stringent manner. However, as a 
stand-alone framework for analysis of the chosen topic, Gould’s work would be 
incomplete.36 Some of the important structural questions needed further elaboration, 
and incorporating more recent theoretical work on network effects and mobile phone 
technology as a factor in collective action issues makes, in my opinion, a great deal of 
sense. This is especially important because mobile networks are expected to have a 
                                              
36 Despite the rather abstract character of his model, it is in fact, based on empirical findings, but these relate to 
19th century Paris (later published in a book, cf. Gould 1995) and thus remain a bit distant to 21st century issues. 
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considerable structural effect by facilitating the work and possibilities of activists. 
Generally, the true impact of technologies of all sorts on political activity seems to be 
a controversial issue (Martin 2001; Wilson 2004). However, my conviction that 
communication technology embodies, at the very least, a field that needs further 
analysis, is shared by other scholars (for an overview, see Garrett 2006). In the 
literature, some of the mechanisms claimed to link technology to political activity are 
the reduction of participation costs, the promotion of collective identity, and the 
creation of community (Garrett 2006:204). I will draw from these and other ideas in 
modeling my own approach in the next section. 
3.3 Bringing in the mobile phone 
As noted earlier, it is increasingly becoming clear that mobile phone networks, in 
addition to other means of communication, are key means of social exchange. A 
number of studies show the importance – even the essential function – of mobile 
phones for teenagers, mothers, working business people, civil society actors, as well 
as other individuals and communities, in micromanaging daily lives, nurturing 
friendships and family ties, and engaging in civil action (cf. Campbell and Park 2008; 
Castells et al. 2007:77-100; Ling 2004; Kwan 2007; Economist 2008b). This is 
undoubtedly most pervasive in more developed countries, but as shown previously, 
other countries are catching up fast (cf. Chapter 1.2).  Moreover, the need to 
incorporate new communication technologies has found its way on the agenda of 
social movement research: 
“It is widely recognized that the spread of new forms of communication is likely to affect 
social organization in depth, and that this requires a reformulation of sociological 
concepts, including that of social relations (Diani 2004:352). 
The previously discussed theories indicate that there is already much to be found in 
the theoretical literature that can advance my research process. This is most obvious 
with Castells’ information age paradigm. However, the impact of mobile 
communications in particular still represents a novelty, calling for further analysis to 
scrutinize its relevance as a factor in collective action, mobilization and network 
society theory. Diani (2004:352) confirms this by stating that “research on networks 
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and participation will have to explore the impact of virtual links”. In the following 
section, I plan to do just that, formulating my hypothesis which I base on the previous 
chapters and which will lay the foundation for the subsequent quantitative analyses. 
3.4 Developing a testable hypothesis 
As we will see further below, the hypothesis that is to be tested in this paper boils 
down to the question whether the developments in the amount of mobile phone users 
can be associated with anti-government demonstrations, riots, or major government 
crises. In this chapter, I will outline how this hypothesis could be developed based on 
the earlier empirical and theoretical findings. 
For simplicity, let us declare that the public good in question is, for example, political 
freedom.37 Any attempt by a government to curb or withhold this freedom is to be 
perceived as an encroachment by those affected. The presumed way to achieve the 
desired state of freedom is to engage in some action against the government. 
Contribution can for example be defined as physical participation in protest activities. 
If some people initiate protests, they will motivate their peers to join in. However, in 
line with Gould (Ch. 3.1.1), it can be argued that these peers will make their decision 
to contribute to protest dependent on their expectations of efficacy. If they are not 
convinced, they will stay home. How can they me made to contribute? The degree in 
which contributions are visible can expected to be the key element to both the 
efficacy and normative argument here. The more visible a protest movement, the 
more likely is an individual’s decision to join because due to the apparent increase of 
contributors, he or she will assume increasing marginal returns.38 However, unless 
there are personal friends among the protesters, the non-contributor may decide to 
wait and see how things develop because the normative social ‘pressure’ is not 
sufficiently given.  
                                              
37 Of course, it could be another public good of concern, including some that may not intuitively fall into the 
field of a political scientist. However, where public collective action is concerned (as it is here), it is reasonable 
to assume that when a public good is at stance, chances that public claims will be somewhat ‘political’ are high. 
38 To stay with Gould’s ‘Maple Street’ analogy: every single non-contributing citizen now represents a greater 
percentage of the total remaining citizens that could join in the protest and bring about change. 
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Now, with mobile networks present, the situation can be expected to change in favor 
of both the fairness and efficacy aspects because more mobile phones increase 
structural effects as described in the network theory section above. Drawing from 
mobilization and diffusion theory, it is plausible to predict that ‘structural proximity’ 
and higher interaction rates through multiple bridging ties could cause faster 
information diffusion through dense networks of individuals directly connected to 
each other, and this could be expected to increase overall and interpersonal visibility 
of any actions planned or being taken. This, in turn, can be expected to result in more 
effective mobilization where mobile networks are more pervasive. How the efficacy 
and fairness aspects are supposed to be positively altered is discussed in the following 
section. 
Efficacy effect amplification 
The more members there are in a network, the higher the expected potential 
mobilization feedback loop or the ‘chain reaction’ that can amplify any message 
spread within a network.39 Every individual is for example, more likely to be the 
recipient of information spread via text messages or a call. As a consequence, 
individual expectations of marginal returns are assumed to increase because the more 
information and feedback one receives about a protest movement, i.e. the more 
‘visible’ the joining in of others becomes, the more likely one will be inclined to 
believe in its success. Due to the mobile phone’s ability to enhance the autonomy of 
individuals and to bypass mass-media (Castells et al. 2007:1), visibility of an issue or 
activity even increases when the media are not reporting it (as illustrated by the 
aforementioned examples of Spain and, initially, China).  
Fairness effect amplification 
The more users there are in a network, the stronger the expected potential fairness 
impact on mobilization. Fairness norms are expected to have an increased effect 
because the mobile phone is such a personal device (cf. Campbell and Park 2008:372; 
                                              
39 Mei-Po Kwan (2007:442) compares this network to hypertext as known from websites; every individual is 
linked to many others just as every website is linked to many others through hypertext. Sending a text message 
to one person can trigger messages to many other users, thus reaching a non-linear, multiplicative effect, or 
sudden jumps and shifts. 
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Ling 2004). It is assumed that nobody likes to be seen as a free-rider by friends and 
relatives; they will on the contrary be more likely to enjoy engaging in cooperative 
action with friends. As mobile telecommunication increasingly gains importance for 
an individual’s social ties, any message or call received is with great likelihood 
assumed to originate from a friend, a work colleague, a family member, a fellow 
student, a friend of a friend, etc. – in other words, from those overlapping ‘hidden 
networks’ that form trusted circuits of exchanges for information and new ideas 
(Melucci 1994:127). The sense of community or collective identity is thus promoted 
(Garrett 2006:205), and fairness norms are assumed to play out their potential here. 
Individuals can therefore be expected to be more motivated to contribute to the 
protest activities rather than to abstain.  
Hypothesis 
I have outlined a plausible advancement of existing theoretical explanations above. 
Against this backdrop, it could be anticipated that an increase in mobile network 
users can lead to increased effectiveness of mobilization due to improved outreach, 
speed and response. An increase in overall mobile connectivity among a country’s 
population can thus be thought to increase political protest activity in this country. 
This expected association can be reformulated into the following hypothesis: 
An increase in mobile connectivity in a country is followed by an increase in political 
activism in the same country. 
Mobile connectivity will be used as a concept that reflects interpersonal linkages 
enhanced by mobile telecommunication technology, while political activism is to 
contain protest activity (see Ch. 4.1). In the analysis in Chapter 5, I attempt to 
identify the effect of mobile connectivity, controlling for some plausible other factors 
while keeping the model parsimonious. Admittedly, developing such a hypothesis 
bears the risk of somewhat stretching the argumentative logic found in the theoretical 
literature. There is, however, a good deal of plausible reasons in both the empirical 
and theoretical literature to formulate and test a relationship as presented above. 
Some caveats will be considered in the next section.  
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3.5 Counterarguments 
”We should not define ICT as a deus ex machina but as a neutral enabling tool that may 
enhance social actors’ capabilities” (Wilson 2004:22). 
While the null hypothesis would state that there is no relation whatsoever between 
mobile connectivity and political activism, a possible alternative hypothesis could 
state the opposite effect – that increased mobile connectivity decreases political 
activism. What would be plausible arguments for these alternatives? 
Mobile connectivity subordinate to human agency 
Much of the hypothesis developed in the previous section rests on the assumption that 
facilitation, provided by increased mobile connectivity, can lead to increased 
activism. While there is a good deal of empirical evidence indicating that this is a 
subsistent scenario, it may not always work that way. Some authors caution against 
giving too much credit to technology: ”[ICT technologies] influence, contextualize, 
facilitate, permit or inhibit courses of action, but not as first-order dynamics that 
change, transform, foster, impose or shape a course of action” (Mansell and Wehn 
1998, cited in Wilson 2004:22-23).40 Such a second-order argument would create a 
distinction between potential and actual effects of mobile connectivity where the 
potential depends on first-order dynamics to unfold its impact. The tilt in the 
outcomes is provided by individuals’ and organizations’ choices when and how to use 
mobile phones, not by the device itself. It is thus important not to assume any 
automatisms or to jump to monocausal conclusions (Wilson 2004:22). For instance, 
increasing visibility may not automatically result in increasing response. A wave of 
SMSes asking the receivers to join a demonstration may for example fail to trigger a 
response for a number of known or unknown reasons that cannot be offset by 
individual efficacy and fairness considerations. And even when the necessary 
structural and psychological requisites are in place, if the principal variable that is to 
trigger human agency does not operate, or if other variables neutralize its workings, 
no measurable effect will be noticed (cf. Wilson 2004).  
                                              
40 ICT in Mansell and Wehn’s usage refers first and foremost to the Internet, but the argument can be a valid 
one within the context of mobile telephony as well. 
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Rapid governmental adaptation 
The dynamic perspective taken on society whereas the state as a factor remains 
conceptually somewhat static could result in a potential logical flaw. Governments 
make use of technological progress for their own purposes. The examples shown in 
Chapter 2 allowed us to observe rapid technological adaptation of civil society actors. 
That government actors do not adapt to technological progress or that they do so at a 
slower pace than civil society actors is highly doubtful. The development of the 
Internet gives an indication of the ingenious ways in which governing elites are able 
to adapt to technologies that challenge their established power. Many countries have 
imposed restrictions on free Internet access. Such measures have been implemented 
despite the Internet’s structural properties that were precisely designed to exacerbate 
censorship and other content interferences (cf. Deibert et al. 2008). The same is 
happening with mobile telecommunications. My interview with Pavel Marozau 
indicates that the state increasingly asserts its power in this area as well. Finding 
empirical evidence of such control is more difficult due to the secrecy typically 
surrounding such measures, and the less open architecture of mobile 
telecommunication systems compared to the Internet. Marozau (2008[interview]) 
highlighted the more subtle workings of such governmental countermeasures. 
Castells et al. (2007:202-205) report a case where the police simply tapped into the 
flows of SMSes between activists during a demonstration in New York and then took 
action based on that information. This can of course be prevented through codes, but 
this restricts the potential for mass mobilization. There are also more forthright 
variants of censorship where mobile networks are simply shut off, either in selected 
areas or altogether. Recent examples are Tibet during the riots prior to the 2008 
Olympic Games in Beijing or Ethiopia during the violent election protests in 2005 
(NZZ 2008a; BBC 2007).41 In both cases, the authorities presumably shut down 
mobile networks in an attempt to prevent their use by journalists and anti-government 
activists. Such crude measures are no doubt highly effective, and together with other 
tactical adaptation by governments, may offset the advantages gained by civil society 
                                              
41 SMS services remained unavailable for two years in Ethiopia which has only one mobile network operator. 
See also Ethioblog (2007). 
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actors (cf. Meier forthcoming). Two possible implications of this are that increased 
mobile connectivity would not result in an increase in political activism, or that it 
may even cause a decrease if states should adapt faster to the technological progress 
than civil society. This is plausible if taking into consideration that new and public, 
omnipresent communication technologies can actually promote the state’s 
surveillance capacities. 
Reverse effects of mobile connectivity 
The same effect that could lead to increased political activism may also lead to its 
decrease (cf. Townsend 2000; Kwan 2007). Mobile phones may facilitate not only 
mobilization, but also demobilization. Protests may be called off just as quickly and 
efficiently as they are initiated due to ‘midcourse adjustments’ and feedback loops 
that work in the opposite direction. 
Socio-economic trends 
Changes in mobile connectivity may be part of a larger socio-economic change that 
may alter civil society’s interaction with the government in many ways, for example a 
transition to more stable forms of political activity.42 The development of political 
activism variables (see Fig. 4.2, B.1 and B.2) over the past 16 years may be an 
indication of this. With too much ‘noise’ created by socio-economic variables it may 
be difficult to identify and isolate the expected effect of mobile connectivity on 
political activism.43  
As the results of the statistical analysis will show, the counterarguments discussed 
here may have to be centerpieces of future research. I will return to this in the 
conclusion. 
                                              
42 Such a relationship is suggested in Gates et al. (2006:901-902). They have found that the higher a country’s 
GDP, the longer its survival rate, which can be an indication of stability. 
43 This argument could be offset if mobile connectivity should increase faster than economic development. A 
correlation test to see whether this could be the case did not produce conclusive results. 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Concept systematization 
The clarification and refinement of concepts is a fundamental task in political 
science, and in turn, a major prerequisite for meaningful discussions of measurement 
validity (cf. Adcock and Collier 2001). The two key concepts in this paper are mobile 
connectivity and political activism. Mobile connectivity can be understood as a 
specific, systematized concept within the larger conceptual background of 
connectivity. The background concept includes other relevant factors such as Internet 
connectivity, urbanization, transportation, cultural linkages and so forth, all elements 
that can be useful in clarifying connectivity. Discussing all these would go beyond 
the scope of this thesis. For the purpose of my research question, I will focus on the 
novel factor of mobile phones; the systematized concept is denoted as ‘mobile 
connectivity’. This term is meant to describe interpersonal linkages via mobile 
telecommunication technology. Political activism, on the other hand, may draw from 
the underlying background concept of political participation and related ideas. I 
systematize this concept for my purposes by restricting ‘political activism’ to the 
public expression of political discontent by members of civil society.44 
4.2 Operationalization 
For the purpose of this analysis, I decided to use the proliferation of mobile phone 
subscriptions in a country to measure mobile connectivity. Mobile teledensity data, as 
it is called (see below for definitions), is considered the best available proxy to this 
concept. There is no other mobile phone data as comprehensive, accessible, and fit 
for per-country comparison I would be aware of. Better still would be traffic data, 
which can measure the amount and location of mobile network usage; Castells et al. 
(2007) seem to have in parts been able to get access to some SMS traffic data, but it 
                                              
44 As mentioned earlier, civil society throughout this work commonly refers to value-based movements in the 
arena of uncoerced collective action. It is defined according to the Center for Civil Society at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science. See LSE (2004) for a more detailed definition. 
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is not generally available to the public and much less so on a national or comparative 
global level in the way mobile teledensity data is. In order to measure political 
activism, three different variables are each tested separately: anti-government 
demonstrations, riots, and major government crises. They were deemed good proxies 
for civil society’s political activism. I deliberately kept out variables that would 
include the measurement of violence beyond riots (guerilla warfare, armed rebellion, 
purges, etc.). The units of measurement are country-years; therefore all definitions 
used below apply to such. A more comprehensive discussion of the validity as well as 
the reasons for including each variable is given in Chapter 4.3. 
4.2.1 The independent variable Mobile Teledensity 
To measure mobile connectivity, an indicator called mobile teledensity is used; it is 
defined as mobile cellular subscribers per 100 population. It refers to the use of 
cellular-technology portable telephones subscribing to a public mobile telephone 
service that relies on either analogue and digital cellular systems.45 Both postpaid and 
prepaid subscriptions are included.46 The data is collected by the ITU47 and provided 
by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals website (MDG 2008). For 
more details on this data and its preparation, see the appendix. In the database, the 
scores are multiplied by a factor of 100.48 I additionally time-lagged (t-1) them in 
relation to the values of the dependent variable, thereby always measuring the 
previous year’s score. This strategy is used to control for reverse causality (cf. 
Smelser 1973:49-51). The mobile teledensity scores were log-transformed because of 
the effect of a unit increase which is expected to be larger for a country with a low 
level on the variable than for a country with a high level. The log-transformation also 
reduces the skewness of the variable (cf. Hegre et al. 2001:37). 
                                              
45 Third-generation cellular technology, so-called 3G services are also covered, while public mobile data and 
radio paging services are not (MDG 2008). 
46 Prepaid means that one buys a fixed amount of airtime, SMS or other services in advance, while postpaid 
means that one uses the mobile phone and gets invoiced accordingly, usually on a monthly basis. 
47 The International Telecommunication Union, a UN subsidiary in Geneva, Switzerland. See www.itu.int. 
48 The multiplication was performed by the data provider. On the MDG (2008) website, the tables show the 
correct values, while the downloadable Excel files have values multiplied by 100. It is not explained, but I 
concluded that the purpose was to eliminate decimals. In any case, this does not affect the regression analysis, 
as a quick test run with values divided by 100 confirmed. 
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4.2.2 The dependent variable Anti-government Demonstrations 
Anti-government demonstration is used to measure political activism. It is defined as 
“[a]ny peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of 
displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding 
demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature” (CNTS 2007). The data is 
provided by the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS 2007), a 
proprietary database.49 According to CNTS, most of the data are derived from The 
New York Times. The variable definitions are adopted from ‘Dimensions of Conflict 
Behavior Within and Between Nations’ (Rummel 1963:5). For more details on this 
data and its preparation, see the appendix.  
                                              
49 Earlier works often quote the database’s founder and former chairman Arthur S. Banks rather than CNTS. 
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In order to approach the concept of political activism more thoroughly, two additional 
indicators, Riots and Major Government Crises, were tested with the data (graphs are 
available in Appendix B). They are also taken from the CNTS database and have the 
same qualities and characteristics (see appendix). Riots are defined as “[a]ny violent 
demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force” 
and Major Government Crises as “[a]ny rapidly developing situation that threatens 
to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at 
such overthrow” (CNTS 2007).  
4.2.3 Control variables GDP, population, and time 
GDP per capita is defined as gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars and is provided by the 
World Bank Group’s World Development Indicators website (WDI 2007). An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the US dollar has in 
the United States. GDP at the purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions 
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for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources (WDI 2007).50 For the same reasons as the mobile teledensity data, the 
WDI scores were time-lagged (t-1) and log-transformed. 
Population is defined as the total population in a country divided by 1000. This 
indicator is available in the CNTS database. Again, the scores were time-lagged (t-1) 
and log-transformed for the abovementioned reasons. There was some indication that 
the density of population also correlated with the main other indicators (see 
appendix), but I decided not to use it as it remained insignificant in the regression 
analyses. Using just one control variable for population was deemed sufficient. For a 
more detailed definition of both variants of population variables, see the appendix. 
Finally, time, measured in years, was included as a dummy variable to control for 
trend effects. The reasons for each variable’s inclusion are discussed below. 
4.2.4 Validity 
Mobile Teledensity 
Using mobile teledensity as a proxy to mobile connectivity was deemed 
straightforward and reasonably sufficient to cover the concept within the framework 
of this paper. Teledensity data is collected by the ITU and is considered very accurate 
and very reliable data (cf. MDG 2008). However, some validity issues did arise and 
are discussed below. 
Tab. 4.1 Mobile teledensity range 
  N Minimum Maximum 
Mobile teledensity 2096 0.05 154.83 
Valid N (listwise) 2096   
Note: Scores in the original dataset are multiplied by a factor of 100 
The registered mobile teledensity levels ranged from 0.05 to 154.83 per 100 
inhabitants (table 4.1) over the whole time period of 16 years. Zero mobile 
teledensity is technically a possible value, but hardly to be found after the late 
nineties, when mobile networks finally spread to virtually every country (reaching 
                                              
50 I would like to thank Beatriz Prieto-Oramas of the World Bank for confirming the detailed definition in an 
email to me. 
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even the most unlikely places). The dataset does not distinguish between a complete 
absence of networks (and hence subscribers) and missing values. In contrast, mobile 
teledensity of 100 percent and more can be found in a number of countries, 
suggesting that everyone there has one or more subscriptions. This is, of course, 
misleading, as there will always be individuals that are too young, too old or too 
disabled to use a phone, and  those who cannot afford one, choose not to have one, or 
are not allowed to own one, e.g. in prisons and asylums (Sutherland 2008). 
This leads us to a central validity issue, namely that some users own several 
subscriptions, while others share one. For example, the current global number of 4 
billion mobile phone subscriptions does not entirely correspond to 4 billion 
individuals with a subscription (NZZ 2008c). Moreover, the per-country 
measurement raises the issue of subscribers that are not residents of the country or 
countries where they are counted, and that may have further subscriptions in other 
countries. Mobile network operators may also have an incentive to report large 
numbers of subscribers, and thus deliberately inflate their customer base, especially 
when negotiating contracts with governments.51 This does, on the other hand, reduce 
the average revenue per user, a factor that can disappoint financial analysts and hence 
the value of the operator. In theory, this should restrain operators from overzealous 
reporting of large numbers of customers (Sutherland 2008).  
Why would certain individuals have several SIM cards? On one hand, wireless 
technology has created a proliferation of SIM cards. They can now be found in laptop 
computers, cars and many other devices.52 This is an example of wealthier customers, 
and some of those SIM cards may not be included in the ITU’s measurement by 
definition (see 4.2.1). The phenomenon called ‘SIM switching’ is more relevant: less 
wealthy users may also have several SIM cards to take advantage of changing tariffs. 
Ewan Sutherland (2008) sums up the reasons for such ownership of more than one 
SIM card: 
                                              
51 A possible strategy to manipulate the size of the customer base is the expiration date of unused SIM cards, 
i.e. how long an operator waits before deactivating idle SIM cards.  
52 They are now even used in remote activation and safety control systems. In Norway, for example, the heating 
at a mountain cabin can be activated by SMS prior to the owner’s arrival. The same cabin can be connected to a 
burglar alarm control center via a SIM-card device (see for example http://www.hyttetorget.no/). 
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 Overcoming patchy or poor network coverage 
 Avoiding network congestion 
 Saving money by making on-net calls [same operator] 
 Benefiting from discounted or bundled tariffs for voice or for data 
 Receiving calls or voicemail [or SMS] to an older number 
The importance of such issues varies from country to country, and makes it difficult 
to estimate how inflated the numbers of users truly are; also, it does not allow for a 
more than approximate per-capita definition of subscriptions (Sutherland 2008). With 
some reservations following from this discussion, the measurement is still expected to 
be reasonably accurate for the purpose of this analysis. 
Anti-government Demonstrations 
Using anti-government demonstrations to measure the concept of political activism as 
described above seems accurate. It measures the mobilization and collective action 
aspect I am interested in – the one that supposedly leads to protest directed against 
the ruling government. It excludes mobilizations “of distinctly anti-foreign nature” 
(CNTS 2007). Clearly, data collected through newspapers can never be truly 
comprehensive. CNTS acknowledges this, and also raises the issue of possible 
geographical bias. This means that events are being seen through the eyes of the US-
based media. Moreover, certain events may not be of a clear domestic nature, as for 
example the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, somewhat blurring the typology used. The 
data provider thus advises to use the data with caution and, in general, “only for 
macroanalytic purposes” (CNTS 2007). As this is the case in my paper, I expect this 
indicator to reasonably cover the underlying concept. 
The CNTS (2007) dataset offers a range of other domestic event variables. Two of 
them seem to be able to cover the concept of political activism to a certain degree; I 
therefore decided to test them as well. 
Additional indicators Riots and Major Government Crises 
Riots were considered to be a likely addition to anti-government demonstrations, 
insofar as these may turn violent.53 The dimension of non-military violence is an 
                                              
53 The significant and fairly strong correlation between riots and anti-government demonstrations seems to 
confirm this view (see table D.2 in the appendix). 
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acceptable addition to the already considered peaceful dimension to cover the concept 
of political activism. However, the data provider’s definition is very sparse and it 
remains somewhat unclear what type of event that is being measured and whether the 
use of ‘citizen’ is intentional (with the implications that may follow from this). The 
concept of political activism requires the indicators to have a minimal political 
connotation. Here the indicator may, in principle, also include criminal (e.g. gang 
fights) or apolitical (e.g. a hooligan brawl) activities, although the threshold of 100 
people may be able to somewhat reduce that problem since this seems a fairly high 
and unlikely number for apolitical riots. With regard to bias and comprehensiveness, 
the same reservations as for anti-government demonstrations apply.  
Major Government Crises as an indicator was thought to cover some aspects of the 
concept as well, particularly the ‘rapidly developing’ situation which could be 
associated with mobile phone enhanced protests and the speed and magnitude of 
response it can facilitate. What the causes of the rapidly developing crises are and 
whether popular pressure (where mobile phones could play a role) or some other 
reason caused the downfall remains somewhat unclear, but it is reasonable enough to 
see it if not as a sign, then at least as a consequence of political activism, and 
therefore the indicator is included in the analysis. Otherwise, the same measurement 
reservations as above with regard to newspaper bias and comprehensiveness apply. 
GDP per capita 
The underlying concept here can be expressed as the (economic) development level 
of a country, which I intend to cover with the chosen indicator GDP per capita. 
Measuring economic strength with GDP is common in the social sciences; there 
should be little validity and reliability concerns. The choice of real (as opposed to 
nominal) i.e. inflation-adjusted dollars, which also account for purchase-power parity, 
should produce a valid measurement. 
Why include this variable? There are two reasons. The first is the relationship 
between mobile teledensity and economic development; the second is a possible 
effect of economic development on political stability.  
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Earlier research has found that teledensity is closely interrelated with economic 
growth (Röller and Waverman 2001; Wilson 2004:30-32).54 In other words, it is 
unlikely to observe one potential causal factor without the other. Finding teledensity 
changes and simultaneously observing economic changes can therefore be expected, 
i.e. there may exist a certain collinearity between the two. Omitting this control 
variable might bias the results for the independent variable (cf. Hegre et al. 2001:37). 
The effects of economic development on political stability have been at the center of 
many studies (cf. Feng 1997; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Londregan and Poole 
1990), some of them linking this effect to the benefits of fewer disruptions, or more 
democracy.  Gates et al. (2006) show that economic development has a positive effect 
on regime survival, which can be understood as an estimate of its stability. The 
evidence seems to be mixed: Camilla Gjerde (2005:231), using an earlier version of 
the CNTS dataset, found a somewhat opposite effect that suggests wealthier countries 
experience on average about one more anti-government demonstration, general strike, 
or riot per year than poorer countries (but not of major government crises), a result 
that seems to be more in line with my argument. A correlation test (see table D.1 and 
D.2 in the appendix) show that GDP significantly correlates with variables used in the 
model.  
As Röller and Waverman’s research relates to pre-1990 data prior to the ascent of 
mobile telephony, it is unclear to what degree their results can be applied to mobile 
teledensity. Research based on more recent data (cf. Wilson 2004:30-36) states an 
association between economic growth and ICT growth, but again, despite being part 
of the concept definition no mobile phone indicators are used to measure ICT 
(telephone landlines and Internet connections are used instead). Despite these caveats, 
GDP seems a plausible factor and will be included in the model. 
                                              
54 Interestingly, the question has long been whether telecommunication infrastructure generates economic 
growth or whether economic growth creates demand for upgraded infrastructure. In a study, Röller and 
Waverman (2001; see also Waverman et al. 2005) concluded that the causality is in fact two-way: 
telecommunication infrastructure and economic growth catalyze one another. 
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Population 
As the teledensity variable has values relative to population, I need to control for this 
to avoid picking up a spurious effect that relates to population rather than mobile 
teledensity levels.  
Time 
While the aim of the analysis is to test causal effects of variables varying in time, it is 
necessary to control for trends in the data by including a time dummy variable 
(Gujarati 2003:643-644). Trends in that sense mean that both the independent and 
dependent variable(s) evolve over time, and that it is possible to predict subsequently 
observed values based on their previous values. Due to this, completely unrelated 
factors can be strongly correlated over time simply because they have a similar 
temporal pattern (Skog 2004:325). Figures 4.1 and 4.2 (see above) seem to imply that 
this is the case here. Hendry (1980, cited in Skog 1988:568) has for example 
demonstrated that one can predict inflation by measuring rainfall. A more familiar 
example may be the so-called sunspot problem: activity registered on the sun’s 
surface has been repeatedly used to ‘demonstrate’ the impact on variables such as 
drug abuse or emigration (Skog 1988:570). Common to these examples is that they 
usually represent relative short time periods, substantially increasing the risk that 
large correlations will be found between unrelated variables (1988:572). In order to 
control for this trend effect, a time dummy variable was introduced which can 
account for unobserved heterogeneity over time (cf. Gujarati 2003:640-651; Beck et 
al. 1998).  
Lagged dependent variable 
A lagged version of the dependent variable can be included as an independent 
variable that measures the previous year’s value (Yt-1). By this measure, which is also 
called autoregressive model, it is possible to control for the possible effect that the 
previous year’s incidence of political activism can have on the following year’s 
incidence, a common procedure in time-series analysis (cf. Gujarati 2003:656). 
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4.3 Panel data analysis 
The units of analysis are country-years, thus combining cross-section and time-series 
analysis into so-called panel data analysis (Gujarati 2003:636-638).55 The CNTS 
(2007) databank comprises of more than 200 countries.56 Countries not represented in 
all three data sources were excluded from the analysis altogether. The remaining 
countries (N = 191) were repeatedly observed over a period of 16 years, from 1991-
2006. The scores for the dependent variables always represent the given year, while 
the scores for the independent variables are from the previous year (t-1) to control for 
reverse causality (cf. Smelser 1973:49-51). 
 
Panel data sets offer advantages over pure cross-section or pure time-series datasets. 
The number of observations is typically much larger; rather than just analyzing 191 
units or 16 years of the same unit, I combined both. This is likely to generate more 
reliable estimates and allows one to detect effects that cannot be identified with pure 
cross-section or time-series data. This also makes more sophisticated models 
available and may alleviate multicollinearity issues because when independent 
variables vary in two dimensions, they are less likely to be highly correlated (Gujarati 
2003:636-638; Mátyás and Sevestre 1995:26). The estimation of panel data 
regression models depends on the assumptions one makes about the constant term. 
One way to take account of the ‘individuality’ of each country is to let the constant 
vary freely over time for each country. This model, known as a fixed-effects 
regression model, was used in this analysis. It is where one adds for example time 
dummies to check for unobserved heterogeneity over time. It is called ‘fixed effects’ 
to distinguish it from ‘random effects’ which would not be appropriate here.57 This 
procedure is a test of whether observations are temporally independent, thus 
correcting for observations that are temporally dependent (cf. Gujarati 2003:640-651; 
Cameron and Trivedi 1998:276; Beck et al. 1998:1260-1261). 
                                              
55 A few countries were excluded and country-years with missing data, see the appendix. 
56 Some of the entities termed ‘country’ may not be entirely sovereign or fully recognized, but as long as data is 
available for all indicators, they will be included in the analysis. In the appendix, a list of excluded countries 
and missing data on specific country-years is available. Unit validity may be slightly affected in some cases due 
to territorial changes (e.g. Indonesia, Ethiopia or Yugoslavia) but was considered negligible. 
57 See Gujarati (2003:650) for an explanation and further references. 
 56
4.4 Regression analysis with categorical data 
The dependent variable determines what type of regression is adequate to analyze a 
given set of data. The dependent data at hand is considered to be categorical. In 
theory, any number of anti-government demonstrations, riots or major government 
crises are possible per year and per country. In practice, only a limited number of 
such events occur (see Appendix C). Continuous variables on the contrary can, in 
principle, assume an infinite number of values (Powers and Xie 2000:2-4). While the 
scores are repeated in a significant portion of the cases, only a limited number of 
demonstrations, riots and crises can be observed. The limit in the data seems to be no 
more than 24 anti-government demonstrations per country in any given year; for the 
other indicators, it is even less (Appendix C). They thus belong to the group of 
discrete variables, which have a finite number of non-negative integer values only, 
i.e. natural numbers starting from zero and with no decimals. Such variables are 
defined as categorical (Powers and Xie 2002:2-3). 
Categorical data analysis requires special statistical methods such as logistic 
regression rather than the linear variant. One cannot assume a linear function with 
categorical variables (cf. Powers and Xie 2000:4; Liao 1994:1). Logistic regression is 
commonly applied to analysis where the dependent variable is binary, while the 
independent variables are continuous, or both continuous and categorical (Field 
2005:780; Powers and Xie 2000:39).58 When the outcome is not binary, as in my 
case, alternatives are the ordinal logistic and multinomial logistic regression for 
ordered or nominal values, respectively. For the special case of event count data 
Poisson regression should be considered. My dependent variable seems to have the 
properties of so-called count data, or rare event data, because the number of anti-
government demonstrations, riots, or major government crises are counted on a per- 
year basis. Due to the data properties a variant of Poisson seems most adequate and is 
discussed in the next section.  
                                              
58 Where both the dependent and independent variables are categorical, log linear analysis can be used (Field 
2005:780; Powers and Xie 2000:39). 
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4.5 Poisson and negative binomial Poisson regression 
Event count data such as the number of car accidents in a city per month is a typical 
example of data that can have a Poisson distribution. Count data regression is useful 
in studying the occurrence rate per unit of time conditional on some independent 
variables.59 The Poisson model requires so-called equidispersion, i.e. the event counts 
in the dependent variable should be evenly distributed so that the distribution’s 
variance is equal to its mean. Failure of this has similar qualitative consequences to 
failure of the assumption of homoskedasticity in the linear regression model. Since 
equidispersion cannot be assumed here – scoring the dependent variable 
predominantly results in zeroes and ones – a variant of Poisson called negative 
binomial Poisson regression can instead be applied. It accounts for so-called 
overdispersion, i.e. more observed variance than the Poisson model would predict 
(Liao 1994:70 and 72; Norušis 2008:270-271; Cameron and Trivedi 1998:71 and 77; 
Gujarati 2003:620-622). Random events will more often than not remain unobserved, 
making zero event counts dominant and as a result, the distribution will be skewed. 
Negative binomial Poisson regression can account for this by adding an extra 
parameter (Cameron and Trivedi 1998:11 and 15-16).60 
The rationale of Poisson distribution is that events are independent from each other.61 
In the case of domestic protest events, this condition may not be given, i.e. events in 
one year may correlate with those in the following year. Such occurrence dependence 
can result in overdispersed distributions and is common in time-series analysis 
(Cameron and Trivedi 1998:16 and 97; Norušis 2008:270). Negative binomial 
Poisson regression can account for part of the overdispersion. In addition,  a lagged 
version of the dependent variable (Yt-1) will be tested in model to account for this 
possible effect and give a better model specification. 
                                              
59 Incidentally, Cameron and Trivedi (1998:275) state that “[a] political science example is the number of 
protests in each of several different countries over many years”. Other examples are the number of vacations 
taken by a family a year, or rare events such as the number of people that get hit by a lightning in week 
(Gujarati 2003:620). 
60 Due to restrictions in the statistical package used the so-called zero-inflated Poisson regression could not be 
tested (cf. Cameron and Trivedi 1998:123-127). 
61 For example, when taking probes of pond water with a bucket, if no other reason affects the distribution the 
chance of getting a certain amount of algae per bucketful should be roughly the same (and not interdependent). 
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5. Regression Analysis 
5.1 Negative binomial Poisson model 
The results of the negative binomial Poisson analysis62 presented below indicate that 
mobile density has no significant effect on anti-government demonstrations when the 
control variables are included (table 5.1). The same is true when using riots or major 
government crises as dependent variables (model 2 and 3). GDP per capita is small 
and insignificant except for riots, where it has a significant negative effect. 
Population has an effect on all three variants of political activism variables.63 The 
significant effects can be interpreted as follows: for a one unit change in the predictor 
variable, the incidence of the political activism variable is expected to increase or 
decrease multiplicatively by the antilog of the coefficient (cf. UCLA 2008).64 The 
interpretation for each dependent variable is specified below.  
Anti-government demonstrations (model 1) 
Both mobile teledensity and GDP are insignificant. A one-unit increase in log 
population is expected to increase the incidence of anti-government demonstration by 
40.1 percent, when the other predictor variables are included in the model.65 
Similarly, a one-unit increase of anti-government demonstration in the previous year 
(labeled as ‘lagged dependent variable’ in table 5.1) increases the incidence of the 
same event in the following year by 39.6 percent. The time variable coefficients are 
negative and roughly increasing in magnitude as the year variable increases; the 
overall significance is at the p<0.01 level (see Appendix E), reflecting the decrease in 
the frequency of demonstrations shown in figure 4.2. 
                                              
62 The Poisson model was dismissed after testing whether the overdispersion parameter in the negative 
binomial Poisson model was equal to zero, the special case where it is identical with the Poisson model. See 
Appendix E for the calculations. 
63 I tested also a variant without the lagged event variable. The results differed only slightly and this significant 
variable was therefore kept in the model. For the results without it, see the appendix. 
64 The estimated coefficient (B) indicates whether the change is an increase (positive sign) or a decrease 
(negative sign). The antilogarithms (exp(B)) are provided in Appendix E. For example, the antilog of 0.337 is 
exp(0.337) = 1.401. This means an increase of 1.4 or 40 percent per one-unit increase of the predictor. 
65 A ‘one-unit increase in log population’ can also be formulated as ‘an increase in population by the factor 
2.718’ (Euler’s constant). 
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Tab. 5.1 Predictors of political activism 1991-2006. Negative binomial Poisson regression  
Variables Model 1 anti-gov demo 
Model 2 
riots 
Model 3 
major gov crises 
Mobile teledensity (log) -.006 (.0482) 
.092 
(.0671) 
-.018 
(.0781) 
GDP per capita (log) -.090 (.0748) 
-.318** 
(.1035) 
-.066 
(.1276) 
Population (log) .337** (.0260) 
.316** 
(.0362) 
.216** 
(.0415) 
Lagged dependent variableb .334** (.0303) 
.448** 
(.0549) 
.963** 
(.1056) 
[year=2006] -.749 (.4201) 
-1.838** 
(.5156) 
-.504 
(.8423) 
[year=2005] -.563 (.4068) 
-1.872** 
(.4983) 
.138 
(.7915) 
[year=2004] -.489 (.3969) 
-1.937** 
(.4889) 
-.186 
(.7903) 
[year=2003] -.630 (.3911) 
-2.250** 
(.4928) 
.071 
(.7663) 
[year=2002] -.578 (.3805) 
-2.347** 
(.4794) 
.551 
(.7387) 
[year=2001] -.964 (.3810) 
-2.160** 
(.4599) 
.322 
(.7327) 
[year=2000] -.120 (.3556) 
-1.695** 
(.4249) 
.392 
(.7169) 
[year=1999] -.624 (.3559) 
-1.877** 
(.4274) 
.100 
(.7107) 
[year=1998] -.222 (.3381) 
-1.913** 
(.4157) 
.362 
(.6906) 
[year=1997] .063 (.3314) 
-.981** 
(.3726) 
1.076 
(.6711) 
[year=1996] -.044 (.3376) 
-1.083** 
(.3866) 
.123 
(.7201) 
[year=1995] .243 (.3332) 
-.718 
(.3710) 
.244 
(.7119) 
[year=1994] -.397 (.3647) 
-1.293** 
(.4319) 
.299 
(.7189) 
[year=1993] -.304 (.3830) 
-1.582** 
(.4951) 
.493 
(.7319) 
[year=1992] .065 (.3708) 
-1.098* 
(.4475) 
1.181 
(.6955) 
[year=1991] 0
a 
(.) 
0a 
(.) 
0a 
(.) 
Intercept -3.011** (.6981) 
-.967 
(.9302) 
-4.023* 
(1.2633) 
Log likelihood -1537.286 -856.620 -642.952 
Chi-square likelihood ratio 535.269 302.938 179.832 
N 1913 1914 1914 
Note: Estimated coefficients are unstandardized negative binomial coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables except 
the time dummy (year) have scores lagged by one year (t-1). SPSS 16.0 for Mac was used. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level and ** at the 0.01 level 
a Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b Yt-1; scores the previous year’s anti-government demonstrations, riots or major government crises, respectively. 
 
Riots (model 2) 
Mobile teledensity has no significant effect. Log GDP is significant here, and is 
estimated to decrease the incidence of riots by 27.3 percent, when the other predictor 
variables are included in the model. A one-unit change in log population increases the 
incidence by 37.2 percent and a one-unit change of riots in the previous year (lagged 
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dependent variable) increases the incidence of the same event in the following year 
by 56.5 percent, with all variables included in the model. The time variable 
coefficients are negative and roughly increasing in magnitude as the year variable 
increases; the overall significance is at the p<0.01 level (see Appendix E). 
Major government crises (model 3) 
Both mobile teledensity and GDP are insignificant. A one-unit increase in log 
population is estimated to increase the incidence of major government crises by 24.1 
percent, when the other predictor variables are included in the model. Similarly, a 
one-unit change of major government crises in the previous year (lagged dependent 
variable) is expected to increase its incidence in the following year by 162.1 percent. 
The time variable is not significant (see Appendix E). 
The same model was also tested with some modifications. A model with aggregated 
counts was tested but the results didn’t change the results in a critical way.66 This was 
done because when there are many counts or few observations for a given count then 
some aggregation of count data may be necessary (Cameron and Trivedi 1998:88). I 
tested also a model that excluded the lagged dependent variable, but including this 
significant variable was considered a better specification and the difference was small 
(see Appendix E for results without this variable). The insignificant results for mobile 
teledensity67 led to the question whether this could be caused by a violation of 
assumptions made about the distribution (see Ch. 4.5). In such cases, it is common to 
consider other parametric distributions, i.e. models that could accommodate features 
of data that are inconsistent with specific assumptions of the negative binomial 
Poisson model (Cameron and Trivedi 1998:96-97). Ordinal regression can be 
adequate in this case, as it accounts for the natural order of count data while 
assumptions of the previously tested model are relaxed.68 The next chapter will give 
                                              
66 For example, where there are few counts above 3 one can recode the data into the categories 0,1,2,3 or more. 
67 I tested also a model with sequential inclusion of the variables. Interestingly, mobile teledensity has a small 
but significant negative effect on political activism variables but this effect is lost when including the time 
dummy (but not with GDP). For the reasons explained in Ch. 4 and the significant correlations (Appendix D) 
between the predictors such a reduced model was not considered a good specification. 
68 The multinomial logistic model is inappropriate for count data for which the outcome, the number of 
occurrences of an event, is naturally ordered. Multinomial logistic regression is useful with nominal data. 
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an indication of whether this can have an effect on the significance of mobile 
teledensity coefficients.  
5.2 Alternative regression models 
5.2.1 Ordinal logistic regression 
In this variant of logistic regression, the number of events are treated as an ordinal 
variable. Because there are such few counts on the higher end of the scale the scores 
were recoded for antigovernment demonstrations and riots, reducing the categories to 
5 and 4 counts, respectively.69 The variable major government crises has only 5 
possible counts and was left that way. For the ordinal logistic regression, the typically 
applied logit link function was not deemed appropriate as it presupposes evenly 
distributed categories. Due to the high number of zeros and lower scores, another link 
function called negative log-log was preferred; it presupposes a distribution where 
lower categories are more probable (Norušis 2008:84). A standard interpretation of 
ordinal logistic regression would be as follows: for a one- unit increase in the 
predictor variable, the log odds of the dependent variable to fall into category 1 or 
higher, rather than in category 0, increases or decreases by the coefficient. Note that 
the log odds for being in category 2 or higher rather than in category 1 (or lower) etc. 
increases by the same ratio (Norušis 2008:80; UCLA 2008).70 
The results did not lead to significant changes compared to the previous regression 
model; mobile teledensity remains insignificant, while both population and the lagged 
dependent variable have a significant and positive effect. GDP has a significant and 
negative effect on riots. 
                                              
69 For the former, the scores 5-24 were collapsed into 5 and the variable renamed into demo6b; for the latter, 
the scores 4-14 and higher were collapsed into 4 and renamed into riot5b (see appendix). Other variants with 
more or fewer categories were tested as well, but the results changed only slightly. 
70 To calculate the odds ratios of the predictors, the estimate can be exponentiated analogous to the exp(B) 
procedure as shown in the negative binomial Poisson section above. 
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Anti-government demonstrations (model 1) 
Both mobile teledensity and GDP are insignificant. For a one-unit change in log 
population, the odds of anti-government demonstration to occur 1 or more times, 
rather than 0, increases by 34.2 percent, given that the other predictor variables are 
included in the model (the same applies for the odds of anti-government 
demonstrations occurring 2 times or more, rather than just once or less, etc.). 
Similarly, a one-unit change of anti-government demonstration in the previous year 
(lagged dependent variable) increases the odds of being on the next higher incidence 
level or above compared to the next lower level or below the following year by 41.6 
percent. 
Riots (model 2) 
Mobile teledensity is insignificant. For a one-unit change in log population, the odds 
of riots to occur more often compared to less often increases by 32.7 percent, when 
the other predictor variables in the model are included in the model. Similarly, a one-
unit change of riots in the previous year (lagged dependent variable) increases the 
odds for more riots compared to less riots the following year by 87.2 percent. Again, 
log GDP seems to be significant and decreases the odds of higher counts compared to 
lower counts of riots by 32.3 percent. 
Major government crises (model 3) 
Both mobile teledensity and GDP are insignificant. For a one-unit change in log 
population, the odds of major government crises to occur more often compared to less 
often increases by 23.6 percent, given that the other predictor variables in the model 
are held constant. Similarly, a one-unit change of major government crises in the 
previous year (lagged dependent variable) increases the odds of more events 
compared to less events the following year by 160.9 percent. 
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Tab. 5.2 Predictors of political activism 1991-2006. Ordinal logistic regression. 
Variables  Model 1 anti-gov demo 
Model 2 
 riots 
Model 3 
major gov crises 
Location Mobile teledensity (log) .027 (.053) 
.088 
(.076) 
-.042 
(.078) 
 GDP (log) -.034 (.082) 
-.280* 
(.114) 
-.078 
(.128) 
 Population (log) .294** (.029) 
.283** 
(.039) 
.212** 
(.041) 
 Lagged dependent 
variableb 
.348** 
(.033) 
.627** 
(.063) 
.959** 
(.093) 
 [year=1991] .375 (.504) 
.628 
(.669) 
.396 
(.825) 
 [year=1992] .779 (.433) 
-.212 
(.707) 
.912 
(.708) 
 [year=1993] .389 (.431) 
.571 
(.585) 
.606 
(.681) 
 [year=1994] .579 (.398) 
.659 
(.546) 
.567 
(.652) 
 [year=1995] 1.045** (.353) 
.696 
(.502) 
.867 
(.593) 
 [year=1996] .851** (.332) 
.678 
(.454) 
.434 
(.608) 
 [year=1997] .469 (.329) 
.276 
(.454) 
1.407** 
(.517) 
 [year=1998] .378 (.311) 
-.013 
(.440) 
.810 
(.507) 
 [year=1999] .336 (.299) 
.264 
(.400) 
.609 
(.502) 
 [year=2000] .439 (.281) 
.113 
(.380) 
.593 
(.489) 
 [year=2001] -.213 (.293) 
-.425 
(.392) 
.663 
(.464) 
 [year=2002] .445 (.259) 
-.278 
(.368) 
.834 
(.439) 
 [year=2003] .299 (.257) 
-.374 
(.367) 
.159 
(.477) 
 [year=2004] .315 (.253) 
.183 
(.311) 
.215 
(.479) 
 [year=2005] .174 (.256) 
.093 
(.309) 
.463 
(.461) 
 [year=2006] 0
a 
(.) 
0a 
(.) 
0a 
(.) 
Thresholdc [event = 0] 4.544** (.544) 
3.189** 
(.724) 
4.201** 
(.897) 
 [event = 1] 5.375** (.548) 
4.311** 
(.732) 
5.895** 
(.882) 
 [event = 2] 5.915** (.552) 
5.150** 
(.744) 
7.505** 
(.937) 
 [event = 3] 6.637** (.559) 
5.867** 
(.764) 
8.899** 
(1.120) 
 [event = 4] 7.107** (.567) – 
9.595** 
(1.325) 
Log likelihood 2828.379 1556.768 1266.735 
Chi-square likelihood ratio  331.004 181.449 171.335 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) .105 .104 .119 
N 1913 1914 1914 
Note: Estimated coefficients are unstandardized negative log-log coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables 
except the time dummy (year) have scores lagged by one year (t-1). SPSS 14.0 for Windows was used. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level and ** at the 0.01 level 
a Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b Yt-1; scores the previous year’s anti-government demonstrations, riots or major government crises, respectively. 
c Intercept-equivalent term. The last category doesn’t have an odds associated (cf. Norušis 2008:71-73). 
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5.2.2 Logistic regression 
Considering that ordinal logistic regression did not improve the results of mobile 
teledensity, I decide to relax the model assumptions a bit further and test logistic 
regression with a dichotomous outcome. With few possible outcomes of values a 
dichotomy of event vs. non-event is a possible solution to deal wit the data. However, 
the logistic regression confirmed the results of the previous regression models but did 
not contribute with new insights. The results for a test with anti-government variable 
can be found at the end of Appendix E. 
5.3 Discussion 
One clear conclusion of my analysis is that mobile teledensity consistently remains 
non-significant throughout all types of models. At the same time, I find that 
population levels have a fairly strong effect on all political activism variables. 
Occurrence of one political activism event in the previous year appears to be a likely 
predictor of the same event in the following year, thus indicating that occurrence 
independence is not given. Economic level measured by GDP seems to be negatively 
associated with riots. The null hypothesis stating no association between mobile 
connectivity and political activism cannot be rejected with 95 certainty. This 
conclusion is considered robust due to the variety of models tested with the data, 
which did not produce notably different results.  
Why are the results for mobile teledensity not significant? Although this indicator 
significantly correlates with the political activism variables (Appendix D), no 
significant effect can be found in a regression model that includes the control 
variables GDP, population, and time. This suggests that the development of political 
activism is not dependent on developments in mobile telephony over the years in any 
measurable way. Running the analysis with mobile teledensity as the only predictor 
produced small but significant results, but these disappeared when including time and 
population as control variables in the model. The non-significant results of GDP are 
somewhat counterintuitive. Gjerde’s (2005:231) conclusion countries with higher 
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GDP experience more anti-government demonstrations and riots are not confirmed by 
my results; riots even showed a contrary result. The analysis suggests that increasing 
GDP reduces the probability of violent (riots), but not peaceful protest (anti-
government demonstrations). Major government crises are not affected by economic 
levels according to my results, either. 
 66
6. Conclusion 
The case studies and interviews in Ch. 2 indicate that mobile phones may have 
potentially gained a central function as facilitators in mobilization and collective 
action processes in the political sphere. Furthermore, the theoretical literature in the 
social sciences offers many different and productive approaches to explain these 
processes, and the potential function of communications technology is recognized but 
not very well-explored. The theoretical base seems broad enough develop a 
hypothesis on possible associations between mobile phone-enhanced social linkages 
and political activism. However, the results of my regression analyses imply that 
mobile connectivity can neither negatively, nor positively be associated with political 
activism. Overall, time trends, population levels and the previous incidence of 
political activism appear to be better predictors of the occurrence of political activism 
than mobile connectivity and economic levels. It seems thus that impressions given 
by some of the cases presented in Ch. 2 are overrated and that generalization by 
means of a global comparative analysis is not possible in the way conducted in this 
thesis. The effect of mobile phones is either inexistent, too weak to be measureable, 
or offset by other factors. The simple assumption that mobile phones alone will create 
a measurable impact on political activism cannot be sustained with the methods and 
data used in this thesis. I will in the following suggest some amendments and outline 
some future work that should be done. 
Outlook 
One of the main counterarguments to the hypothesis mentioned at the end of chapter 
3 was the issue of monocausality. Although mobile phones were not treated as causes 
of political activism, network society theory still claimed this communication 
technology (together with the Internet) to be an ‘indispensable medium’ in the 
workings of 21st century society. From the results achieved, one can conclude that if 
mobile communication truly is a necessary condition, it may not be a sufficient one 
for the effects stated. What other variables could be relevant? Castells et al. (2007) 
repeatedly highlight their view that mobile phones, while powerful and important in 
the context of 21st century political activism, must interact with a particular media 
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environment to unleash their potential in the sense discussed in this thesis. Including 
media freedom71 or other media variables into the analysis may be a possible avenue 
to tackle this aspect. In some of the examples observed, the Internet seems to have 
played an important role as a backup information and dissemination source on which 
users of mobile phones were able to rely. It may be worthwhile to analyze the 
combined impact of mobile phones and the Internet, in addition to (more traditional) 
media variables, although the very low Internet penetration rates (cf. Ch. 1.2) in many 
non-Western countries may cause difficulties in extracting useful information from 
such data. In countries with low Internet accessibility, other media such as the radio 
may substitute for the Internet, a factor that can be accounted for. Broadening the set 
of variables included as predictors of political activism may, interestingly, return the 
debate to the background concept of connectivity I briefly mentioned in Ch. 4.1. This 
could imply that mobile connectivity is only one link in a chain of factors that 
amounts to connectivity effects. After all, even highly motivated would-be protesters 
need travel infrastructure (roads, railways, etc.) to join a demonstration, and their 
motivation will depend on a variety of information sources such as websites, TV 
channels or radio stations and perhaps an urban setting that provides spatial proximity 
to enough other potential protesters.  
These connectivity issues relate to my next point, namely lack  of systematic research 
with regard to relevant context variables. There seems to be no scholarly work trying 
to identify the main variables in important cases where mobile phone activity was 
deemed crucial. This is problematic because ‘context’ is often named as an important 
factor, while little reference is made to what kind of context variables besides media 
and Internet access are considered important. There is clearly a need for more 
research to identify these variables, perhaps through comparative case studies. Large-
N analysis could greatly profit from this in order to formulate models that can control 
for the relevant context factors. 
                                              
71 It is unclear though how cases such as Spain, which is not usually a country associated with state-controlled 
media, would fit into model that includes media freedom. The mobile phone’s impact at the 2004 elections was 
precisely due to the fact that established media outlets of Spain were not capable to fulfill the responsibility 
they supposedly have in such a free and democratic society (cf. Ch. 2.2). 
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In future analyses similar to this one, it may be worthwhile to expand the definition of 
agents in political activism to capture additional moments of collective action and 
mobilization. There is often a certain bias when describing activists; demonstrators 
are usually pictured as benign actors, as fighters for a good cause and exponents of 
‘civil society’ (cf. LSE 2004). This does not imply that mobile networks may never 
be used for malign purposes, that the “power of grassroots mobilization cannot be 
subjected to the perils of demagogy” (Castells et al. 2007:256) or that there will only 
be “uniformly benevolent outcomes” (Rheingold 2002:163). Little seems to be 
known of such examples72, but further inquiries may be able to advance the research 
efforts on where mobile connectivity plays a role. 
Furthermore, I would also like to mention the rapid adaptation, or the potential ‘arms 
race’ between civil society and governing elites as mentioned in Ch. 3.5. It seems 
plausible to argue that the situation under democratic and the one under oppressive 
regimes cannot be compared in terms of how communications technology is being 
used. For those more concerned with authoritarian governments’ dealing with citizens 
empowered with mobile phones, a possible way to control for this would be to 
separate the analysis by regime type and check whether the mobile phone has a larger 
impact in freer societies compared to oppressed ones. It may also be important to 
keep in mind that governments, whether autocratic or not, have varying capacities in 
terms of resources, such as technical equipment and skilled specialists. It may be 
much easier to deal with an opposition newspaper than with a technically advanced 
communication network that everybody in a country, not just opposition groups, use. 
To further develop this approach a distinction by regime strength may be fruitful – 
weak governments may be less capable of coping with ‘smart mobs’ than stronger 
ones. 
                                              
72 Pavel Marozau (2008[interview]) gave an example, describing the large state-sponsored youth organization 
BDSM in Belarus which uses the same mobile phone tactics as the opposition movement. Similar organizations 
exist in Russia and elsewhere.  
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Appendix B: Variable definitions and characteristics 
The independent variable Mobile Teledensity 
Definition:   Mobile cellular subscribers per 100 population [per country]. 
Mobile cellular subscriber refers to the use of cellular-technology 
portable telephones subscribing to a public mobile telephone service. 
Analogue and digital cellular systems up to third-generation 
technology (3G) are covered. Public mobile data and radio paging 
services are excluded. Both postpaid and prepaid subscriptions (i.e. 
invoice-based vs. pre-purchase-based) are included. In the database, 
the values are multiplied by a factor of 100, presumably to eliminate 
decimals (MDG 2008). 
Origin: United Nations Millennium Development Goals website (MDG 2008). 
The data is collected by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), a UN subsidiary. 
Preparation: The data can be downloaded in various formats. Excel was used in this 
case. The data structure had to be manipulated before it was possible 
to import this indicator into SPSS. To keep control, the country codes 
from the CNTS (2007) data were paired with the respective country in 
this database. Countries represented in the mobile teledensity database 
but not in the CNTS database were removed. Once imported into 
SPSS. Double-checking the country codes immediately reveals 
discrepancies thus giving maximum safety with this data handling. 
The scores for this indicator are time-lagged in relation to the 
dependent variable values, i.e. from the previous year (t-1). This 
strategy is used to control for reverse causality (cf. Smelser 1973:49-
51). 
Characteristics: Continuous, non-normal. The variable was log-transformed because of 
the effect of a unit increase which is expected to be larger for a 
country with a low level on the variable than for a country with a high 
level. The log-transformation also reduces the skewness of the variable 
(cf. Hegre et al. 2001:37). 
The dependent variable Anti-government Demonstration 
Definition: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people [in a country] for 
the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a 
distinctly anti-foreign nature. 
Origin: The data is available in the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive 
(CNTS 2007) by Databanks International, a proprietary database. 
According to CNTS, most of the data are derived from The New York 
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Times. The variable definitions are adopted from ‘Dimensions of 
Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations’ (Rummel 1963:5). 
Preparation: The data is available in Excel format and can easily be imported into 
SPSS. Each country is already assigned a code from a range between 
10 and 1300. This is helpful, if not necessary, to handle large datasets, 
and therefore the CNTS dataset determined the structure and was used 
as a base to which all other imported data were adapted to. 
Characteristics: Discrete, non-negative integer values that count events per country-
year.  
For the variables Riots and Major Government Crises, the same information as above 
applies. The definitions go as follows: 
Riots Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens [in a 
country] involving the use of physical force. 
Major Gov- 
ernment Crises Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall 
of the present regime [in a country] - excluding situations of revolt 
aimed at such overthrow. 
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Fig. B.1 Riots 1991-2006 Fig. B.2 Major Government Crises 1991-2006 
Source: CNTS 2007  Source: CNTS 2007  
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The control variable GDP per capita 
Definition: Gross domestic product per capita [in a country] based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars.  
An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as 
the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser’s prices is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources (WDI 2007). 
Origin: The World Bank Group’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
website (WDI 2007). 
Preparation: The WDI website has a very user-friendly à la carte approach; one can 
choose countries, time periods and indicators and the desired data can 
then be downloaded in Excel format. Again, the data had to be 
manipulated in the same manner as the original mobile teledensity data 
(see above) before it was possible to import it into SPSS. The same 
procedure as with teledensity data was used to achieve the t-1 time lag. 
Characteristics: Continuous, non-normally distributed variable. It was log-transformed 
because of the effect of a unit increase which is expected to be larger 
for a country with a low level on the variable than for a country with a 
high level. The log-transformation also reduces the skewness of the 
variable (see analogous procedure with mobile teledensity data above). 
The control variable Population 
Definition:  [A country’s human] population divided by 1000. 
 This term is not described any further in the database, but a quick 
check indicates that it refers to the number of residents in a country. 
Origin: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS 2007). According to 
CNTS, the number of individually consulted sources was unusually 
large and therefore no bibliographic references were provided. I 
double-checked some values I am familiar with, which were correct. I 
assume that the data is trustworthy. Some references such as ‘The 
Statesman’s Yearbook’ and the ‘Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society’ are mentioned, but refer to earlier years in the dataset. 
Preparation: This indicator was included for the relevant time period 1990-2006 in 
the CNTS database. All that was needed to be done was to make sure 
that the time lag of t-1 was applied. 
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Characteristics: Continuous, non-normally distributed. It was log-transformed to 
reduce the skewness of the variable (see analogous procedure with 
mobile teledensity data above).  
The control variable Population Density (not used in the final analysis) 
Definition: [A country’s human] population per square mile. 
The values are directly calculated from two other variables in the 
CNTS (2007) database, namely Area in Square Miles and Population, 
and then multiplied by 10. 
Origin, preparation and characteristics are identical to the population variable. 
 
The control variable Time 
Definition: Year of measurement. 
Origin: CNTS (2007). 
Preparation: None.  
Characteristics: Continuous. It is used as a categorical dummy variable in the analysis.  
 
The lagged dependent variable as a control variable 
Definition: See anti-government demonstrations, riots, or major government 
crises. 
Origin: CNTS (2007). 
Preparation: Time-lagged by one year (t-1).  
Characteristics: Discrete, non-negative integer values that count events per country-
year. Used as a continuous variable in the model. 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent variable (incl. riots and major government crises) 
Tab. C.1 Valid and missing cases 
 
  
Anti-gov 
Demo Riots 
Major Gov 
Crises 
Valid 3012 3013 3013N 
Missing 44 43 43
 
 
Tab. C.2 Anti-government Demonstration frequencies 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 2370 77,6 78,7 78,7
1 314 10,3 10,4 89,1
2 134 4,4 4,4 93,6
3 97 3,2 3,2 96,8
4 34 1,1 1,1 97,9
5 26 ,9 ,9 98,8
6 13 ,4 ,4 99,2
7 10 ,3 ,3 99,5
8 6 ,2 ,2 99,7
9 4 ,1 ,1 99,9
10 2 ,1 ,1 99,9
12 1 ,0 ,0 100,0
24 1 ,0 ,0 100,0
Valid 
Total 3012 98,6 100,0  
Missing System 44 1,4   
Total 3056 100,0   
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2500 
 
Tab. C.3 Riots frequencies 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 2671 87,4 88,6 88,6
1 202 6,6 6,7 95,4
2 75 2,5 2,5 97,8
3 31 1,0 1,0 98,9
4 17 ,6 ,6 99,4
5 4 ,1 ,1 99,6
6 6 ,2 ,2 99,8
7 1 ,0 ,0 99,8
8 1 ,0 ,0 99,8
11 2 ,1 ,1 99,9
12 2 ,1 ,1 100,0
14 1 ,0 ,0 100,0
Valid 
Total 3013 98,6 100,0  
Missing System 43 1,4   
Total 3056 100,0   
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Fig. C.1 Anti-government Demonstration frequencies 
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Tab. C.4 Major Gov Crises frequencies 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 2678 87,6 88,9 88,9
1 272 8,9 9,0 97,9
2 53 1,7 1,8 99,7
3 8 ,3 ,3 99,9
4 1 ,0 ,0 100,0
5 1 ,0 ,0 100,0
Valid 
Total 3013 98,6 100,0  
Missing System 43 1,4   
Total 3056 100,0   
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Fig. C.2 Riots frequencies 
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Independent variables Teledensity, GDP, and Population 
Tab. C.5 Valid and missing cases 
 
  
Mob 
Density t-1 GDP t-1 Population t-1 
Valid 2096 2735 3020N 
Missing 960 321 36
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Fig. C.3 Major Government Crises frequencies 
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Fig. C.5 Mobile Teledensity log-transformed 
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Fig. C.4 Mobile Teledensity (scores are multplied by 100) 
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Appendix D: Bivariate Correlations 
Tab. D.1 Bivariate Correlations 
 
  
Mob 
Density GDP Population 
Pop 
Density 
Anti-gov 
Demo Riots 
Major 
Gov 
Crises 
Mob  Pearson Corr. 1  
Density Sig. (2-tailed)   
  N 2096  
GDP Pearson Corr. ,548(**) 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   
  N 1928 2735  
Population Pearson Corr. -,040 -,044(*) 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,065 ,022   
  N 2093 2708 3020  
Pop  Pearson Corr. ,092(**) ,196(**) -,015 1  
Density Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,399   
  N 2094 2709 3020 3021  
Anti-gov Pearson Corr. -,082(**) -,053(**) ,220(**) -,037(*) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,006 ,000 ,043   
  N 2085 2701 3005 3006 3012 
Riots Pearson Corr. -,070(**) -,064(**) ,153(**) -,019 ,558(**) 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,001 ,000 ,300 ,000  
  N 2085 2702 3006 3007 3012 3013
Major Gov Pearson Corr. -,072(**) -,062(**) ,083(**) -,031 ,343(**) ,232(**) 1
Crises Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,001 ,000 ,084 ,000 ,000  
  N 2085 2702 3006 3007 3012 3013 3013
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Mob Density, GDP, Population, and Pop Density are lagged by one year (t-1) 
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Tab. D.2 Bivariate Correlations with log-transformed independent variables 
 
  
ln Mob 
Density ln GDP 
ln 
Population 
ln Pop 
Density  
Anti-
gov 
Demo Riots 
Major 
Gov 
Crises 
ln Mob  Pearson Corr. 1   
Density Sig. (2-tailed)    
  N 2096   
ln GDP Pearson Corr. ,516(**) 1   
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000    
  N 1928 2735   
ln Pearson Corr. -,065(**) -,111(**) 1   
Population Sig. (2-tailed) ,003 ,000    
  N 2093 2708 3020   
ln Pop  Pearson Corr. ,133(**) ,127(**) -,157(**) 1   
Density Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000    
  N 2094 2709 3020 3021   
Anti-gov Pearson Corr. -,074(**) -,012 ,258(**) ,024 1  
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,520 ,000 ,196    
  N 2085 2701 3005 3006 3012  
Riots Pearson Corr. -,072(**) -,060(**) ,202(**) ,052(**) ,558(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,002 ,000 ,005 ,000   
  N 2085 2702 3006 3007 3012 3013 
Major Gov Pearson Corr. -,068(**) -,039(*) ,141(**) ,020 ,343(**) ,232(**) 1
Crises Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,045 ,000 ,285 ,000 ,000  
  N 2085 2702 3006 3007 3012 3013 3013
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Note: ln Mob Density, ln GDP, ln Population, and ln Pop Density are lagged by one year (t-1) 
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Appendix E: SPSS Outputs 
The Poisson model was dismissed after performing the following log likelihood (LL) test:  
-2(LL(Poisson)-LL(NegBinPoisson)) > 0 
Poisson is the special case of the negative binomial Poisson where this parameter is 0. The LL(Poisson) with 
anti-government demonstration is -1828.615, with riots -974.843, and with major government crises -657.396 
(see below). The LL(NegBinPoisson) values can be found in table 5.1 above. The results were all greater than 
zero (582.658, 236.446 and 28.888, respectively). 
 
E.1 Negative binomial Poisson regression with anti-gov demo 
Tab. E.1.1 Case Processing summary 
 N Percent 
Included 1913 62.6%
Excluded 1143 37.4%
Total 3056 100.0%
Tab. E.1.2 Continuous Variable Information 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Dependent Variable Anti-gov Demo 1913 0 24 .49 1.298
ln Mob Density t-1 1913 1.61 9.65 5.9319 2.11187
ln GDP t-1 1913 5.49 11.17 8.8069 1.18744
ln Population t-1 1913 3.76 14.09 8.7310 1.98453
Covariate 
Anti-gov Demo lagged 
t-1 1913 0 24 .50 1.323
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Tab. E.1.3 Goodness of Fitb 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 1523.309 1893 .805
Scaled Deviance 1523.309 1893  
Pearson Chi-Square 2681.464 1893 1.417
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 2681.464 1893  
Log Likelihooda -1537.286   
Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC) 3114.572
  
Finite Sample Corrected AIC 
(AICC) 3115.016
  
Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) 3225.701
  
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 3245.701   
Dependent Variable: Anti-gov Demo 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, demolagged, year 
a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria. 
b. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 
Note: The ratio of the deviance to its degrees of freedom should be close to 1 to indicate a good 
model fit (Norušis 2008:255-259).  
 
Tab. E.1.4 Omnibus Testa 
Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
535.269 19 .000
Dependent Variable: Anti-gov Demo 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, 
demolagged, year 
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only 
model. 
 
 
Tab. E.1.5 Tests of Model Effects 
Type III 
Source 
Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 40.011 1 .000
ln_t1mobdens .016 1 .898
ln_t1gdp 1.448 1 .229
ln_t1pop 192.182 1 .000
demolagged 144.543 1 .000
year 33.636 15 .004
Dependent Variable: Anti-gov Demo 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, demolagged, year 
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Tab. E.1.6 Parameter estimates of the negative binomial Poisson regression  
including the lagged dependent variable (demolagged). 
Parameter B Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) 
(Intercept) -3.011 .6981 .000 .049
ln_t1mobdens -.006 .0482 .898 .994
ln_t1gdp -.090 .0748 .229 .914
ln_t1pop .337 .0260 .000 1.401
demolagged .334 .0303 .000 1.396
[year=2006] -.749 .4201 .075 .473
[year=2005] -.563 .4068 .167 .570
[year=2004] -.489 .3969 .218 .613
[year=2003] -.630 .3911 .107 .533
[year=2002] -.578 .3805 .129 .561
[year=2001] -.964 .3810 .011 .381
[year=2000] -.120 .3556 .735 .887
[year=1999] -.624 .3559 .079 .536
[year=1998] -.222 .3381 .511 .801
[year=1997] .063 .3314 .850 1.065
[year=1996] -.044 .3376 .897 .957
[year=1995] .243 .3332 .465 1.275
[year=1994] -.397 .3647 .276 .672
[year=1993] -.304 .3830 .428 .738
[year=1992] .065 .3708 .862 1.067
[year=1991] 0a . . 1
(Scale) 1b    
(Negative 
binomial) 1 
   
Dependent Variable: Anti-gov Demo 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, demolagged, year      
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.        
b. Fixed at the displayed value.         
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Tab. E.1.7 Parameter estimates of the negative binomial Poisson 
regression excluding the lagged dependent variable (demolagged). 
Parameter B Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) 
(Intercept) -3.356 .6801 .000 .035
ln_t1mobdens .025 .0469 .599 1.025
ln_t1gdp -.125 .0722 .083 .882
ln_t1pop .407 .0249 .000 1.502
[year=2006] -.753 .4155 .070 .471
[year=2005] -.416 .4008 .299 .659
[year=2004] -.440 .3930 .263 .644
[year=2003] -.593 .3874 .126 .553
[year=2002] -.555 .3773 .141 .574
[year=2001] -.728 .3735 .051 .483
[year=2000] -.034 .3531 .923 .967
[year=1999] -.458 .3513 .193 .633
[year=1998] -.015 .3365 .965 .985
[year=1997] .211 .3312 .523 1.235
[year=1996] .208 .3363 .537 1.231
[year=1995] .415 .3323 .212 1.514
[year=1994] -.191 .3634 .600 .826
[year=1993] -.120 .3771 .751 .887
[year=1992] .205 .3667 .576 1.228
[year=1991] 0a . . 1
(Scale) 1b    
(Negative binomial) 1    
Dependent Variable: Anti-gov Demo 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, demolagged, year  
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b. Fixed at the displayed value. 
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E.2 Negative binomial Poisson regression with riots 
Note: Only outputs with new information are included below. N = 1914. 
Tab. E.2.1 Goodness of Fitb 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 1016.933 1894 .537
Scaled Deviance 1016.933 1894  
Pearson Chi-Square 3089.603 1894 1.631
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 3089.603 1894  
Log Likelihooda -856.620   
Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC) 1753.240
  
Finite Sample Corrected AIC 
(AICC) 1753.683
  
Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) 1864.379
  
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 1884.379   
Dependent Variable: Riots 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, riotlagged, year 
a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria. 
b. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 
 
Tab. E.2.2 Omnibus Testa 
Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
302.938 19 .000
Dependent Variable: Riots 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, 
riotlagged, year 
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only 
model. 
 
Tab. E.2.3 Tests of Model Effects 
Type III 
Source Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 11.449 1 .001
ln_t1mobdens 1.889 1 .169
ln_t1gdp 9.599 1 .002
ln_t1pop 84.006 1 .000
riotlagged 88.556 1 .000
year 47.459 15 .000
Dependent Variable: Riots 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, riotlagged, year 
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Tab. E.2.4 Parameter estimates of the negative binomial Poisson regression  
including the lagged dependent variable (riotlagged). 
Parameter B Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) 
(Intercept) -.967 .9302 .299 .380 
ln_t1mobdens .092 .0671 .172 1.096 
ln_t1gdp -.318 .1035 .002 .727 
ln_t1pop .316 .0362 .000 1.372 
riotlagged .448 .0549 .000 1.565 
[year=2006] -1.838 .5156 .000 .159 
[year=2005] -1.872 .4983 .000 .154 
[year=2004] -1.937 .4889 .000 .144 
[year=2003] -2.250 .4928 .000 .105 
[year=2002] -2.347 .4794 .000 .096 
[year=2001] -2.160 .4599 .000 .115 
[year=2000] -1.695 .4249 .000 .184 
[year=1999] -1.877 .4274 .000 .153 
[year=1998] -1.913 .4157 .000 .148 
[year=1997] -.981 .3726 .008 .375 
[year=1996] -1.083 .3866 .005 .339 
[year=1995] -.718 .3710 .053 .488 
[year=1994] -1.293 .4319 .003 .275 
[year=1993] -1.582 .4951 .001 .206 
[year=1992] -1.098 .4475 .014 .334 
[year=1991] 0a . . 1 
(Scale) 1b    
(Negative binomial) 1    
Dependent Variable: Riots 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, riotlagged, year 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.        
b. Fixed at the displayed value.         
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Tab. E.2.5 Parameter estimates of the negative binomial Poisson regression  
excluding the lagged dependent variable (riotlagged). 
Parameter B Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) 
(Intercept) -1.249 .9071 .169 .287 
ln_t1mobdens .092 .0649 .156 1.097 
ln_t1gdp -.338 .1006 .001 .713 
ln_t1pop .377 .0350 .000 1.458 
[year=2006] -1.862 .5074 .000 .155 
[year=2005] -1.809 .4885 .000 .164 
[year=2004] -1.948 .4805 .000 .143 
[year=2003] -2.313 .4868 .000 .099 
[year=2002] -2.329 .4761 .000 .097 
[year=2001] -2.146 .4531 .000 .117 
[year=2000] -1.623 .4173 .000 .197 
[year=1999] -1.637 .4061 .000 .195 
[year=1998] -1.413 .3896 .000 .244 
[year=1997] -.811 .3678 .028 .444 
[year=1996] -.913 .3798 .016 .401 
[year=1995] -.697 .3713 .060 .498 
[year=1994] -1.220 .4294 .005 .295 
[year=1993] -1.250 .4616 .007 .287 
[year=1992] -.898 .4348 .039 .407 
[year=1991] 0a . . 1 
(Scale) 1b   
(Negative binomial) 1   
Dependent Variable: Riots 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, riotlagged, year 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.    
b. Fixed at the displayed value.     
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E.3 Negative binomial Poisson regression with govcrisis 
Note: Only outputs with new information are included below. N = 1914. 
Tab. E.3.1 Goodness of Fitb 
 Value df Value/df 
Deviance 736.401 1894 .389
Scaled Deviance 736.401 1894  
Pearson Chi-Square 2068.429 1894 1.092
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square 2068.429 1894  
Log Likelihooda -642.952   
Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC) 1325.903
  
Finite Sample Corrected AIC 
(AICC) 1326.347
  
Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) 1437.042
  
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 1457.042   
Dependent Variable: Major Gov Crises 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, govcrisislagged, year 
a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria. 
b. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 
 
 
Tab. E.3.2 Omnibus Testa 
Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
179.832 19 .000
Dependent Variable: Major Gov Crises 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, 
govcrisislagged, year 
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only 
model. 
 
 
Tab. E.3.3 Tests of Model Effects 
Type III 
Source 
Likelihood Ratio 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 16.465 1 .000
ln_t1mobdens .055 1 .815
ln_t1gdp .272 1 .602
ln_t1pop 28.436 1 .000
govcrisislagged 83.842 1 .000
year 22.103 15 .105
Dependent Variable: Major Gov Crises 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, govcrisislagged, year 
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Tab. E.3.4 Parameter estimates of the negative binomial Poisson regression  
including the lagged dependent variable (govcrisislagged). 
Parameter B Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) 
(Intercept) -4.023 1.2633 .001 .018
ln_t1mobdens -.018 .0781 .814 .982
ln_t1gdp -.066 .1276 .602 .936
ln_t1pop .216 .0415 .000 1.241
govcrisislagged .963 .1056 .000 2.621
[year=2006] -.504 .8423 .550 .604
[year=2005] .138 .7915 .862 1.148
[year=2004] -.186 .7903 .814 .830
[year=2003] .071 .7663 .926 1.074
[year=2002] .551 .7387 .456 1.735
[year=2001] .322 .7327 .661 1.379
[year=2000] .392 .7169 .584 1.480
[year=1999] .100 .7107 .888 1.105
[year=1998] .362 .6906 .601 1.436
[year=1997] 1.076 .6711 .109 2.932
[year=1996] .123 .7201 .864 1.131
[year=1995] .244 .7119 .732 1.276
[year=1994] .299 .7189 .677 1.349
[year=1993] .493 .7319 .501 1.637
[year=1992] 1.181 .6955 .089 3.258
[year=1991] 0a . . 1
(Scale) 1b    
(Negative binomial) 1    
Dependent Variable: Major Gov Crises 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, govcrisislagged, year     
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.        
b. Fixed at the displayed value.         
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Tab. E.4.5 Parameter estimates of the negative binomial Poisson regression  
excluding the lagged dependent variable (govcrisislagged). 
Parameter B Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) 
(Intercept) -5.006 1.2076 .000 .007 
ln_t1mobdens -.053 .0744 .475 .948 
ln_t1gdp -.009 .1200 .943 .991 
ln_t1pop .292 .0398 .000 1.340 
[year=2006] -.270 .8213 .742 .763 
[year=2005] .336 .7742 .664 1.400 
[year=2004] .081 .7726 .916 1.085 
[year=2003] .372 .7481 .619 1.450 
[year=2002] .928 .7197 .197 2.528 
[year=2001] .551 .7161 .442 1.734 
[year=2000] .596 .7049 .398 1.815 
[year=1999] .451 .6953 .517 1.569 
[year=1998] .770 .6760 .255 2.159 
[year=1997] 1.208 .6623 .068 3.345 
[year=1996] .295 .7122 .679 1.342 
[year=1995] .488 .7004 .486 1.628 
[year=1994] .559 .7076 .429 1.750 
[year=1993] .920 .7001 .189 2.510 
[year=1992] 1.186 .6901 .086 3.273 
[year=1991] 0a . . 1 
(Scale) 1b    
(Negative binomial) 1    
Dependent Variable: Major Gov Crises 
Model: (Intercept), ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, year 
      
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.        
b. Fixed at the displayed value.         
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E.4 Ordinal logistic regression with anti-government demonstrations 
Tab. E.4.1 SPSS Warning 
There are 9565 (83,3%) cells (i.e., dependent variable levels by combinations of predictor 
variable values) with zero frequencies. 
Note: This is a common problem when continuous predictor variables are included in ordinal logistic regression models (cf.  
Norušis 2008). 
 
  
Tab. E.4.2 Case Processing Summary 
  N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
0 1489 77,8%
1 213 11,1%
2 81 4,2%
3 64 3,3%
4 24 1,3%
Antigov 
Demo 6 
New 
5 42 2,2%
1991 38 2,0%
1992 45 2,4%
1993 54 2,8%
1994 66 3,5%
1995 81 4,2%
1996 94 4,9%
1997 112 5,9%
1998 131 6,8%
1999 142 7,4%
2000 150 7,8%
2001 158 8,3%
2002 164 8,6%
2003 169 8,8%
2004 171 8,9%
2005 172 9,0%
Meas 
Year 
2006 166 8,7%
Valid 1913 100,0%
Missing 1143  
Total 3056  
 
  
Tab. E.4.3 Model Fitting Information 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 3159,383    
Final 2828,379 331,004 19 ,000
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
  
Tab. E.4.4 Goodness-of-Fit 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 8082,226 9541 1,000
Deviance 2828,379 9541 1,000
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
Note: These diagnostics are not reliable when continuous predictor  
variables are used in the model (cf. Norušis 2008:78). 
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Tab. 4.5 Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell ,159 
Nagelkerke ,197 
McFadden ,105 
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
 
Tab. E.4.6 Parameter estimates of the ordinal logistic regression with anti-gov demonstration. 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
[demo6b = 0] 4,544 ,544 69,838 1 ,000 3,478 5,610
[demo6b = 1] 5,375 ,548 96,161 1 ,000 4,301 6,449
[demo6b = 2] 5,915 ,552 114,979 1 ,000 4,834 6,996
[demo6b = 3] 6,637 ,559 140,983 1 ,000 5,542 7,733
Threshold 
[demo6b = 4] 7,107 ,567 157,186 1 ,000 5,996 8,218
ln_t1mobdens ,027 ,053 ,255 1 ,613 -,077 ,131
ln_t1gdp -,034 ,082 ,173 1 ,677 -,194 ,126
ln_t1pop ,294 ,029 106,069 1 ,000 ,238 ,350
demo6lagged ,348 ,033 111,606 1 ,000 ,283 ,412
[year=1991] ,375 ,504 ,555 1 ,456 -,612 1,363
[year=1992] ,779 ,433 3,242 1 ,072 -,069 1,627
[year=1993] ,389 ,431 ,817 1 ,366 -,455 1,233
[year=1994] ,579 ,398 2,115 1 ,146 -,201 1,359
[year=1995] 1,045 ,353 8,792 1 ,003 ,354 1,736
[year=1996] ,851 ,332 6,564 1 ,010 ,200 1,502
[year=1997] ,469 ,329 2,035 1 ,154 -,175 1,114
[year=1998] ,378 ,311 1,475 1 ,224 -,232 ,987
[year=1999] ,336 ,299 1,263 1 ,261 -,250 ,922
[year=2000] ,439 ,281 2,437 1 ,119 -,112 ,991
[year=2001] -,213 ,293 ,528 1 ,467 -,786 ,361
[year=2002] ,445 ,259 2,965 1 ,085 -,062 ,952
[year=2003] ,299 ,257 1,353 1 ,245 -,205 ,803
[year=2004] ,315 ,253 1,546 1 ,214 -,181 ,811
[year=2005] ,174 ,256 ,458 1 ,499 -,329 ,676
Location 
[year=2006] 0(a) . . 0 . . .
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
a  This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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E.5 Ordinal logistic regression with riots 
Note: Only outputs with new information are included below. N = 1914. 
Tab. E.5.1 Model Fitting Information 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 1738,217    
Final 1556,768 181,449 19 ,000
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
Tab. E.5.2 Goodness-of-Fit 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 6321,826 7633 1,000
Deviance 1556,768 7633 1,000
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
Tab. E.5.3 Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell ,090 
Nagelkerke ,152 
McFadden ,104 
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
Tab. E.5.4 Parameter estimates of the ordinal logistic regression with riots. 
95% Confidence Interval 
  Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
[riot5b = 0] 3,189 ,724 19,382 1 ,000 1,769 4,609
[riot5b = 1] 4,311 ,732 34,687 1 ,000 2,876 5,745
[riot5b = 2] 5,150 ,744 47,942 1 ,000 3,692 6,608
Threshold 
[riot5b = 3] 5,867 ,764 58,991 1 ,000 4,370 7,364
ln_t1mobdens ,088 ,076 1,318 1 ,251 -,062 ,237
ln_t1gdp -,280 ,114 6,012 1 ,014 -,504 -,056
ln_t1pop ,283 ,039 51,295 1 ,000 ,205 ,360
riot5lagged ,627 ,063 100,095 1 ,000 ,504 ,749
[year=1991] ,628 ,669 ,881 1 ,348 -,683 1,938
[year=1992] -,212 ,707 ,090 1 ,764 -1,598 1,173
[year=1993] ,571 ,585 ,950 1 ,330 -,577 1,718
[year=1994] ,659 ,546 1,455 1 ,228 -,411 1,729
[year=1995] ,696 ,502 1,923 1 ,165 -,288 1,681
[year=1996] ,678 ,454 2,229 1 ,135 -,212 1,569
[year=1997] ,276 ,454 ,368 1 ,544 -,614 1,165
[year=1998] -,013 ,440 ,001 1 ,976 -,875 ,849
[year=1999] ,264 ,400 ,437 1 ,509 -,519 1,048
[year=2000] ,113 ,380 ,088 1 ,766 -,632 ,858
[year=2001] -,425 ,392 1,181 1 ,277 -1,193 ,342
[year=2002] -,278 ,368 ,571 1 ,450 -1,000 ,443
[year=2003] -,374 ,367 1,041 1 ,308 -1,094 ,345
[year=2004] ,183 ,311 ,346 1 ,557 -,427 ,793
[year=2005] ,093 ,309 ,090 1 ,764 -,513 ,698
Location 
[year=2006] 0(a) . . 0 . . .
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
a  This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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E.6 Ordinal logistic regression with govcrisis 
Note: Only outputs with new information are included below. N = 1914. 
Tab. E.6.1 Model Fitting Information 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 1438,070    
Final 1266,735 171,335 19 ,000
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
Tab. E.6.2 Goodness-of-Fit 
  Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 6873,515 9546 1,000
Deviance 1266,735 9546 1,000
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
Tab. E.6.3 Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell ,086 
Nagelkerke ,162 
McFadden ,119 
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
 
Tab. E.6.4 Parameter estimates of the ordinal logistic regression with major gov crises. 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
[govcrisis = 0] 4,201 ,867 23,470 1 ,000 2,501 5,901
[govcrisis = 1] 5,895 ,882 44,715 1 ,000 4,167 7,623
[govcrisis = 2] 7,505 ,937 64,089 1 ,000 5,667 9,342
[govcrisis = 3] 8,899 1,120 63,128 1 ,000 6,704 11,095
Threshold 
[govcrisis = 4] 9,595 1,325 52,434 1 ,000 6,998 12,192
ln_t1mobdens -,042 ,078 ,287 1 ,592 -,195 ,111
ln_t1gdp -,078 ,128 ,370 1 ,543 -,328 ,172
ln_t1pop ,212 ,041 26,237 1 ,000 ,131 ,294
govcrislagged ,959 ,093 106,051 1 ,000 ,776 1,141
[year=1991] ,396 ,825 ,231 1 ,631 -1,222 2,014
[year=1992] ,912 ,708 1,662 1 ,197 -,475 2,300
[year=1993] ,606 ,681 ,792 1 ,373 -,729 1,941
[year=1994] ,567 ,652 ,757 1 ,384 -,710 1,844
[year=1995] ,867 ,593 2,141 1 ,143 -,295 2,029
[year=1996] ,434 ,608 ,509 1 ,475 -,758 1,627
[year=1997] 1,407 ,517 7,408 1 ,006 ,394 2,420
[year=1998] ,810 ,507 2,550 1 ,110 -,184 1,804
[year=1999] ,609 ,502 1,472 1 ,225 -,375 1,592
[year=2000] ,593 ,489 1,467 1 ,226 -,366 1,552
[year=2001] ,663 ,464 2,040 1 ,153 -,247 1,573
[year=2002] ,834 ,439 3,606 1 ,058 -,027 1,694
[year=2003] ,159 ,477 ,111 1 ,739 -,776 1,094
[year=2004] ,215 ,479 ,202 1 ,653 -,723 1,154
[year=2005] ,463 ,461 1,007 1 ,316 -,441 1,366
Location 
[year=2006] 0(a) . . 0 . . .
Link function: Negative Log-log. 
a  This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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E.7 Binary logistic regression 
Note: Only the relevant results with antigov demo are shown below. 
Tab. E.7.1 Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 315,950 19 ,000
Block 315,950 19 ,000
Step 1 
Model 315,950 19 ,000
 
 
Tab. E.7.2 Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 1707,918(a) ,152 ,233
a  Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter  
estimates changed by less than ,001. 
 
 
Tab. E.7.3 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 13,993 8 ,082
 
 
Tab. E.7.4 Parameter estimates of the logistic regression with antigov demo. 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
ln_t1mobdens -,008 ,064 ,014 1 ,905 ,992
ln_t1gdp -,013 ,099 ,016 1 ,899 ,988
ln_t1pop ,377 ,037 104,151 1 ,000 1,457
demolagged ,426 ,050 72,727 1 ,000 1,532
year    22,887 15 ,087  
year(1) ,167 ,609 ,075 1 ,784 1,181
year(2) ,821 ,541 2,305 1 ,129 2,273
year(3) ,438 ,525 ,695 1 ,405 1,549
year(4) ,678 ,483 1,971 1 ,160 1,970
year(5) 1,116 ,439 6,451 1 ,011 3,053
year(6) 1,119 ,412 7,362 1 ,007 3,062
year(7) ,532 ,400 1,765 1 ,184 1,702
year(8) ,258 ,385 ,450 1 ,502 1,294
year(9) ,351 ,364 ,932 1 ,334 1,421
year(10) ,396 ,344 1,330 1 ,249 1,486
year(11) -,246 ,352 ,488 1 ,485 ,782
year(12) ,521 ,312 2,791 1 ,095 1,684
year(13) ,418 ,307 1,850 1 ,174 1,518
year(14) ,292 ,306 ,911 1 ,340 1,339
year(15) ,166 ,309 ,290 1 ,590 1,181
Step 
1(a) 
Constant -5,206 ,662 61,787 1 ,000 ,005
a  Variable(s) entered on step 1: ln_t1mobdens, ln_t1gdp, ln_t1pop, demolagged, year. 
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Appendix F: SPSS Logs 
F.1 Negative binomial Poisson regression 
* Generalized Linear Models. 
GENLIN demo BY year (ORDER=DESCENDING) WITH ln_t1mobdens ln_t1gdp ln_t1pop
 demolagged 
  /MODEL ln_t1mobdens ln_t1gdp ln_t1pop demolagged year INTERCEPT=YES 
 DISTRIBUTION=NEGBIN(1) LINK=LOG 
  /CRITERIA SCALE=1 COVB=MODEL PCONVERGE=1E-006(ABSOLUTE) SINGULAR=1E-
012 ANALYSISTYPE=3(WALD) CILEVEL=95 CITYPE=WALD LIKELIHOOD=FULL 
  /MISSING CLASSMISSING=EXCLUDE 
  /PRINT CPS DESCRIPTIVES MODELINFO FIT SUMMARY SOLUTION (EXPONENTIATED). 
Note: the procedure with riot and govcrisis as the dependent variable was identical; 
demolagged was replaced with riotlagged and govcrisislagged, respectively. 
 
F.2 Ordinal logistic regression 
First the dependent variable was recoded. The procedure for riot was similar (4 categories). 
RECODE 
  demo 
  (SYSMIS=SYSMIS)  (0=Copy)  (1=Copy)  (2=Copy)  (3=Copy)  (4=Copy)  (5 
  thru Highest=5)  INTO  demo6b . 
VARIABLE LABELS demo6b 'Antigov Demo 6 New'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
PLUM 
  demo6b  BY year  WITH ln_t1mobdens ln_t1gdp ln_t1pop demolagged 
  /CRITERIA = CIN(95) DELTA(0) LCONVERGE(0) MXITER(100) MXSTEP(5) 
PCONVERGE 
 (1.0E-6) SINGULAR(1.0E-8) 
  /LINK = NLOGLOG 
  /PRINT = FIT PARAMETER SUMMARY . 
Note: the procedure with riot5b and govcrisis as the dependent variable was identical; 
demolagged was replaced with riotlagged and govcrisislagged, respectively. 
 
F.3 Logistic regression 
RECODE 
  demo 
  (SYSMIS=Copy)  (0=Copy)  (1 thru Highest=1)  INTO  demobin . 
VARIABLE LABELS demobin 'Antigov Demo binary'. 
EXECUTE . 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION  demobin 
  /METHOD = ENTER ln_t1mobdens ln_t1gdp ln_t1pop demolagged year 
  /CONTRAST (year)=Indicator 
  /PRINT = GOODFIT 
  /CRITERIA = PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5) . 
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Appendix G: Miscellaneous 
Tab. G.1 World ICT statistics 1996-2006  (numbers are in millions) 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Landlines 738 792 846 905 983 1'053 1'086 1'140 1'207 1'261 1'270 
Mobile 
subscribers  
145 215 318 490 740 955 1'166 1'414 1'766 2'221 2'685 
Personal 
computers  
275 325 375 435 500 555 615 650 775 808 n/a 
Internet 
users  
74 117 183 277 399 502 619 724 870 1'006 1'131 
Source: ITU 2007 
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Fig. G.1 Mobile phone subscribers, global comparison 
Source: ITU 2007 
 
Fig. G.2 Internet users, global comparison 
Source: ITU 2007 
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The following countries (or territories) were removed because data was only available in one or two, but not in 
all three data sources (MDG 2008, CNTS 2007, WDI 2007) and/or not for the entire period. Comments in 
parenthesis are for information only; all countries in this list are completely excluded from the analysis. 
Excluded countries:
American Samoa 
Anguilla 
Anjouan (1997-2007, secession from Comoros) 
Bermuda 
Bophuthatswana (part of South Africa since 1993) 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Channel Islands 
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
China, Macao Special Administrative Region 
Ciskei (part of South Africa since 1993) 
Cook Islands 
Cyprus (Greek part only) 
Cyprus (Turkish part only) 
Czechoslovakia (until 1992) 
Faeroe Islands 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 
French Guiana 
French Polynesia 
Greenland 
Guadeloupe 
Guam 
Isle of Man 
Korea, People’s Republic (North Korea) 
Martinique 
Mayotte 
Montenegro (since 2006) 
Montserrat 
New Caledonia 
Niue 
Northern Mariana Islands 
Palau 
Puerto Rico 
Reunion 
Somaliland (since 1991, secession from Somalia) 
Taiwan 
Timor-Leste (since 2002) 
Transkei (part of South Africa since 1993) 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
United States Virgin Islands  
Vatican City 
Venda (part of South Africa since 1993) 
 
 
Some countries had some missing data years but were nevertheless included in the analysis. In three cases, the 
data was modified in the dataset. 
 
Included countries with missing data years: 
 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia) have missing data prior to 1993. 
Eritrea (formerly part of Ethiopia) has missing data prior to 1993. 
Palestine (Occupied Territories) has missing data prior to 1994. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (all 15 former Soviet Republics) have missing data 
prior to 1992. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia have missing data prior to 1992. 
 
Modifications in the dataset: 
 
The country-year Algeria 2005 and Serbia-Montenegro 2004 were missing in the CNTS dataset.  
The missing scores were later supplied from the data provider on my request.73 
Serbia-Montenegro ceases to exist under the country-code 1290 in 2006. The code 1292 for Serbia 2007 was 
changed back to 1290 to retain continuity in the dataset, but some of Serbia’s scores for 2007 are affected by 
loss of territory. 
 
 
 
 
73 Kent Wilson from Databanks International (CNTS 2007) was so kind to email the missing values to me. 
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Appendix H: Interviews 
 
Interview with Ivan Marovic from Otpor, Serbia.  
Wednesday, 5th of June 2008.74 
 
As you may have understood I am very much interested in the use of mobile phones in 
protest activities. How common were mobile phones in Serbia, back in 2000? Did you own 
one? 
  
Ivan Marovic: As you may remember in the late nineties cell phones were still rare and 
expensive, especially for young people. During the 96-97 protests only a few people had 
mobile phones. But in 2000 almost everybody had a mobile. The turning point was the 
[NATO] bombing in 1999. 
 
How so? 
 
Well, lots of parents were worried about their children. If they go out are they going to be 
safe etc. 
 
So they bought their kids mobile phones? 
  
Indeed, the hit was nokia 5110 or something. I bought my first cell phone in 1998, but by the 
summer of ‘99 everybody had a cell phone. 
 
That is quite early even by European standards. This is actually a very interesting aspect. 
But let’s turn to some questions about the Otpor movement now. I believe Otpor was quite a 
decentralized organization. Is this correct? What was your role in this movement? 
 
I was one of the founders of Otpor, and my responsibilities were the press and PR, but also 
relations with political parties and domestic NGOs. Otpor was decentralized in its structure. 
It was the model that we adopted very early, based on the lessons learned from student 
protests in 96-97. 
 
In an interview with Christophe Chiclet75, a French journalist, Ana Vuksanovic, a member 
of Otpor, says “What got me excited was that there weren’t any leaders, so there was no risk 
of being betrayed” Were there really no leaders? 
                                             
 
Exactly. That was lesson one from the previous protest. No leaders – no disappointment. 
 
 
74 Interview performed from 4 p.m. to ca. 6 p.m. (GMT+1 time) via the chat and voice function of Skype. The 
interviewer was in located in Oslo, Norway, the interviewee in New York, USA. Some parts were reviewed a 
few days later via email exchange. 
75 See http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_03/uk/droits.htm  
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How practical was that? Or were there leaders in function but not in name? 
 
The leadership was hidden. On the surface we had a mantra – there are no leaders, we are all 
activists. In reality we had some sort of hierarchy. 
 
Tell me more about it. 
 
Because we didn't have titles the authority had to be based on personal initiative. And our 
people couldn’t say “do this because I tell you so”. They had to invent reasons and motivate 
people. The idea was the following: 11 people started Otpor, and we had some authority 
based on that when other people started to join. They initiated different actions and got 
reputation in their communities. This is how new leadership emerged. Since the strategy was 
frontloaded, i.e. we made the plan when we were still 11 people, there was no need to make 
a decision. Later, we didn’t change the plan much. This was the reason for our collapse after 
Milosevic was overthrown. 
 
I see.  If you don’t mind let’s turn to some practical aspects of your organization. How did 
you keep in touch with the others? How did they keep in touch with you? Did the mobile 
phone play any role in this? 
 
There were two means of communication: the Internet and the mobile phone. We used the 
Internet between offices (laptops were still expensive) and mobile phones because of their 
abundant availability. In the beginning SMS [text messages] were still free. Later they 
started charging for the service but it was still cheap. 
 
Which one was more important, and in what ways? 
  
The Internet was important for strategic communication. The website with the information 
about the movement, news, documents and recruitment forms. On the other hand, cell 
phones were crucial for operational and tactical communication. At the Belgrade office, we 
had two landlines. One was taken for the dial-up (yes, that was the Stone Age of the 
Internet). So there was really only one landline. 
 
What did you use that one for? 
 
We left that one open for people to call us. We totally depended on cell phones. 
 
Where calls with mobile phones expensive? 
 
Very expensive. But we used SMS a lot. For instance, to invite people to a meeting we had a 
program that would send SMS to the listed numbers. 
 
You did that through a website? Was it free of charge? 
 
Yes. In those days there was still some free stuff around. Even the SMS service itself was 
free in the beginning. I remember when I had a Nokia 1611, that phone didn’t have a clock, 
so whenever I wanted to know the time, I would send myself an SMS – since it was free. 
 
Who operated the website in question? 
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The website was operated by several activists, but Braca Andjelkovic and Igor Jeremic were 
operating it in 1999 and 2000. 
 
In an interview with Wired76, you once said that “if you march on the capital without proper 
controls, things may turn violent, which will harm your cause”. What kind of controls did 
you refer to? 
  
Control meaning organization like in the phrase “everything is under control”. 
 
How did you do that practically? How did you have things under control as events were 
evolving? Did you have any real-time oversight of the unraveling developments for example 
in Belgrade? How did you retain control in such a dynamic process? 
  
There are three components: First, there’s preparation. We prepared people for what they 
should do and what they should expect. This was the reason for the ten days before the 
October fifth [the day Milosevic was forced to resign]. In those ten days people were 
prepared through the local actions they were doing. 
 
What kind of local actions are you referring to? 
  
Blocking a local road, or a strike in the local factory. This is the momentum build-up. But 
also training for the big one. Then, when the big one happens, there is the second 
component: keeping activists busy. This means that if you give them a task, they will not 
turn violent, or at least that will be less likely. So everybody had to have a task to perform. 
 
Sort of channeling the energy to constructive things. 
 
Exactly. And the third component is… luck. But the overall idea is that there should be 
enough people that can make a decision if something happens, and react accordingly. 
Leaders are dispersed throughout the crowd. And they are in horizontal communication. 
 
Speaking of communication, and to return to what you said above: Was Braca Andjelkovic 
some kind of “information minister” with his website? 
  
[Laughs] I thought I was. 
 
With this I mean, was his SMS website crucial for your tactical purposes? 
 
Braca wasn’t responsible for the content, he was like a webmaster. Strategic communication 
was mostly connected to press and PR. Most of the communication was tactical and 
operational. These were more logistical issues 
  
I am very interested in the logistical part as well... at least where mobile phones played out. 
 
The logistical part was based on circles of trust. I didn’t know the details of the distribution 
of our material. I knew that they had a garage, but I didn’t know where it was. They would 
                                              
76 See http://www.wired.com/gaming/gamingreviews/news/2005/10/69372  
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organize the shipping with cars, for larger quantities. Smaller packages would go by bus. 
That was impossible to intercept. Cell phones were crucial for those operations. 
 
How so? 
 
Because these operations were happening in real time. For instance, I go to the bus station 
and ask a bus driver to deliver a package and give him some money, too. Then I call or SMS 
the person in the other town with the info. Shipping by bus was the cheapest and most 
reliable form of transport. 
 
Speaking of real time, can you give me an example how you would use SMS to change a 
demonstration or other task in real time, while it was happening? 
 
Let me think [pauses]. Well, the most important was the march from Novi Sad to Belgrade 
on April 14th, 2000. That’s some 80km, 24 hours on foot. We had to coordinate things while 
walking. For example, the food waiting for us in different towns. Also, buses for those who 
couldn’t walk anymore. Then the welcoming rally in Belgrade, and finally, to inform the 
press. I used up three [cell phone] batteries that night. 
 
You had extra batteries with you? 
 
Yes, I had one extra. And then I had to take another one from somebody else.  
 
You recharged them somewhere, in a car maybe? 
  
No, I thought that two would be enough. So I didn’t bother recharging the first one. 
But anyway, to answer your question: That was a demo 100% operated through mobile 
phones. 
 
No websites at work? 
 
There was a functioning website. But on the road we didn’t have much use of it. 
 
From a practical and technical perspective, would you say that the mobile phone system was 
more advanced than the Internet, in Serbia, at that time? 
 
Yes indeed. More people were using it. Internet was still dial-up. There was some 1-2% 
ISDN [faster, digital connections]. Those were the days of web 1.0, static web sites. On the 
other hand, mobile phones were not like today. Only speech and SMS. No photos, no MP3, 
radio or GPRS [fast data transfer]. But you could carry them. 
 
Would those things have made a difference? 
  
Yes. We had four laptops and four digital cameras to record police brutality. Imagine if we 
had had phones with cameras. Like last year in Burma. 
  
Or in Tibet, I believe some of the pictures of the Lhasa riots slipped out of China via MMS 
[picture SMS]. How about MP3 and GPRS? 
 
I don't know about MP3, how that would help. But GPRS would be helpful. 
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How so? 
 
Well, just the fact that you can access the Internet on your cell phone. I’m sure that would be 
helpful. I just haven’t thought of an actual application yet [pauses to think]. Oh, I can think 
of one application: For instance, it is not wise to have your contacts in your phone, if you are 
arrested. But if there is an intraportal and you can access it. I’m not sure, but something like 
that. 
 
It totally makes sense to me. This actually leads me to the next question: What happened 
after such arrests? Did they use your network contacts? 
 
I don’t know exactly. But they did take away our cell phones. And everybody was arrested. 
But I cannot confirm that they found them through the address book. They could easily find 
them just through surveillance. 
 
Did you ever experience action by the state authorities directed against your mobile phone 
connection? Such as unexpected shut-offs or other interferences? Did you ever suspect 
eavesdropping? 
 
I don’t remember the first or the second, but we would always shut off our cell phones 
and take out the batteries when we wanted to discuss some important issues. We simply 
assumed to be under surveillance. Because we probably were. 
 
Was it a coincidence that they started charging for SMS, or do you suspect it was related to 
Otpor’s extensive use of it? 
 
No, I believe that was just business reasoning. Too much SMS traffic. 
 
Thank you, Ivan, we can stop here, I know you have to leave soon. This interview has been 
extremely useful. It confirms my assumptions more than I ever imagined it would. 
 
[Surprised] Really? Actually, there is this guy at Tufts, Rusty or something, I can give you 
his contacts – he interviewed me a while ago, but he was only interested in the Internet. I 
didn’t have much to say about that, I would have rather talked about cell phones. Now 
there’s finally someone interested in phones! [laughs] 
 
I was actually a bit afraid of the opposite. That you would only want to talk about the web… 
 
Really? [Laughs]  Ok, I have to go now. Let’s take this up again on Friday. 
 
Ok. Thank you very much again. 
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Interview with Pavel Marozau from Third Way, Belarus. 
July 28th, 2008. 77 
Unfortunately, Western media cover very little Belarusian politics. Can you tell me a little 
bit about Belarus in general and the opposition movement in particular? What is your role 
in it? 
Pavel Marozau: Belarus is a post-soviet state between Russia and Poland, very 
industrialized, very denationalized [due to cultural russification], and situated on the main 
energy transit routes from Russia to EU. Belarus gained independence in 1991. After that, 
we had several years of more or less democratic government. After 1996 the government 
under first president Lukashenka (elected 1994) turned into a dictatorship. He and his people 
successfully suppressed all main opponents, took control over the media, big business, the 
armed forces, the law system, parliament and other key institutions. 
I see. Can you say a bit more about the opposition movement, and your role? 
Yes. Sure. The opposition began in 1995-1996 with good start positions. Still in parliament, 
and with a lot of allies in the state machine. But opposition couldn’t find an effective way of 
competition with Lukashenka and lost referendums in 1996 and 2004 as well as the 
presidential elections in 2001 and 2006. 
The key problems are the opposition’s fragmentation into several groups, the big influence 
of Belarusian secret services, a lack of charismatic leaders, limited access to media and, 
finally, the lack of resources as well as the atmosphere of total control in the country. 
Now the opposition has the following key groups: United Opposition Forces (coalition of 
several political parties), Za svobodu movement and allies (2006 presidential candidate 
Milinkevich’s group of support), independent youth groups. There is also the Christian 
Democratic Party BPF under Zenon Poznyak, the principal ideological opposition. 
Are you a member of any of those? 
Our organization can be located among the independent youth groups. Now we’re building a 
new network. We’re trying to unite these youth groups. Youth leaders and the Belarusian 
Diaspora abroad in one cooperation network called ‘Congress of New Belarusian Diaspora 
of Europe and the US”. The 1st Congress was held in Tallinn in March 2008 
How does Third Way [Pavel’s own organization78] belong into this network? 
The Third Way’s specialization is to be a mediator and coordinator for others.  Because of 
our HR policy, we’re oriented on talented and experienced persons in our recruiting. Young 
professionals, one could say. We use modern IT and media technologies for best results. 
                                              
77 Interview performed from 11.20 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. (GMT+1 time), using the Skype chat function. The 
interviewer was located in Oslo, Norway, the interviewee in Tallinn, Estonia. Some parts were reviewed upon a 
personal meeting in Tallinn on August 1st 2008. 
 
78 See belarus.3way.org. 
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From the outside, we support activity groups inside Belarus with advice, educational 
possibilities and some resources and services. 
As you surely know by know, my research focus is on the use of mobile phones in 
antigovernment activity. How common are mobile phones among Belarusians? Can most 
people afford one? 
So, about mobile market in Belarus… 
Yes, if you don't mind me interrupting. 
Ok. Look at these figures: In 2001, there were around 130’000 users of mobiles in Belarus. 
At the end of 2007, there were 7,129 million. Belarus has a total population of 10 million. 
Impressive! 
We can now say that mobiles are very common in Belarus. 
Among young people as well? 
Sure, they are drivers of these techs. 
Are calls or SMS expensive? 
I can't say so, but it’s affordable. Neither cheap nor expensive. 
How many rubles is one sms? 
There’s no cost for incoming calls. One SMS cost 110 rubles, MMS 450 rubles (Velcom 
operator). We have 4 operators, Velcom and MTS are bigger, while Dialog/Belcel and BEST 
are the smaller ones. 
One SMS is then ca. 0.03 Euros. Is that [110.- BYR] a lot of money for an average student? 
It is ok. Students usually have budgets of around 100 USD a month, some have more. 
Basically all [telephone]operators are directly or indirectly under state control. 
That’s interesting. How are they controlled? 
Historically, the first operator Belcel/Dialog opened in the 90s in cooperation with a Western 
company, from the US or NL if remember right. But with a control pack of shares by 
Byeltech Export, a state company which sells weapons, and BelTeleCom, another state 
company, I can say there is a state monopoly on landlines and the Internet. 
After 2000, such a scheme was also used for the operator Velcom (some percentage went to 
Syrian investors, others to BelTeleCom and another arms dealer). Later, the Russian player 
MTS came in, but also received only 49% of the shares, 51% went to the state. But recently, 
there has been a change. Now an Austrian telecoms company owns part of those 51%, giving 
the state a minority share. 
Let us go to the next question now. 
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Yes? 
On Third Way’s website79, you state a number of ‘tactical priorities’. Third Way is to be an 
independent third-party network organization of civil activists. Among the responsibilities 
mentioned, there is ‘up-to-date and safe communication’. I suppose the Internet plays an 
important role here, but how about the mobile phone? 
This is an interesting question. We have, I can say, a several-layers communication scheme. 
Because we operate in 9 countries, and need to coordinate all these activities, we need to mix 
our ways of communication. 
In Belarus, we use mobiles only for usual, not serious things. The problem is that, especially 
in periods of elections or so, all mobiles conversations are easily being intercepted by the 
authorities. 
They just need to select person and declare that it is politically sensitive and any mobile 
operator will cooperate with them. 
That is scary. 
We widely use Skype for our main communications because it is more or less secure and 
easy to use. We use skype2mobile communications in some cases when we need to remain 
anonymous. 
Also for secure sites, emails, forums, social networks... Outside Belarus, there are much 
more mobiles and Skype is also cheaper.  
Is skype2mobile safe? 
If we call to one of our activists who are under control [surveillance], no. But in some cases 
when we need to make anonymous calls to some institutions, it is ok. 
Among those tactical priorities, you also mention ‘effective mobilization’. Can you say a bit 
more about this? Are mobile phones an important tool in mobilization? 
Let me first tell you a few things about SORM80. It is an integrated system of 
communications control founded in the USSR but updated in Russia and is now being used 
in Russia, Belarus, and possibly in the Ukraine by police and KGB [intelligence services] to 
search for criminals and political targets. 
It works with normal landlines, mobiles and internet. Very advanced. Some versions can 
even trace person on base his or her voice. 
Now about mobilization. Yes, I think so [that it is an important tool in this]. Because 
mobilization is not only about political conversations. It is about normal communications 
with people, involving them in activities. Because of this, mobiles are very essential in such 
cases. So I think mobiles play an important role. 
                                              
79 http://belarus.3way.org/about 
80 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SORM 
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Can you give me examples? 
Yes. For example, a new person finds our website and sends an email ‘I want to know more’ 
and ‘I want to cooperate’. We can ask ‘give me your mobile number’ and then call to him to 
say ‘hello, can we meet somewhere, drink coffee and I can tell you more about us’... 
Excellent example. 
Also, mobiles are good during opposition actions for operative coordination and reporting to 
media and say for example that you’ve been arrested... 
Do you remember situations where you or your friends did use it that way? 
Just a sec. My mother’s calling - also on the mobile [smiles]. 
Ok, I’m back. My mother went to my investigator at the Prosecutor’s office.  He said “oh he 
[Pavel] went from us, it is such a pity. We really haven’t got any plans to arrest him, no no” 
[smiles]. Very nice. 
Unbelievable. I hope you feel safe in Tallinn. 
The idea - now for them a key thing, is to return me to Belarus. Abroad they can’t control 
and can’t have any influence on me.  And my activity becomes more and more problematic 
for them. 
But let’s return to our questions. 
Yes, an example of real use by opposition activists 
So, a few real examples of mobilization and several funny and unfunny examples from 
mobile communications. 
Yes, please. 
1. Funny: 2005, Cartoon crisis.  
I went to Kiev [Ukraine] by train. At night, I was stopped by border guards on the Belarusian 
side. They said ‘you can’t pass on to Ukraine’. Ok, I then sat there. But my friends tried to 
call me on my mobile. Ok, they get a connection and some person says “Hello, who do you 
need? Pavel? Ok. Who are you? ... I will ask him now...” and then silence (they just intercept 
calls, especially international ones, and try to find out who is calling. Since then, a big media 
scandal [Russian TV exposing Belarusian police state behavior, subjecting the authorities to 
ridicule] has somewhat put a limit to this). 
After that my friends began to play games with them: ‘Hello, Mossad, or CIA calling, where 
is Pavel?’ To be sure, they used Skype or Ukrainian mobiles for those jokes because 
Belarusian ones can easily be traced.  
2. Not Funny: 2005, Minsk, the day before important actions together with partners in 
Gomel [Belarus’ second largest city]. 
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We planned a humoristic street action in Minsk on 1st of May [Labor Day]. We were not so 
experienced and because of this our partner from Gomel needed to come in Minsk and assist 
us. He was under control from Gomel authorities; the police prevented him several times 
from taking the train. He went to Minsk by microbus. He switched off his mobile, but in 
Minsk he decided to call me to select a meeting place. In normal secure mode, we need to 
use “ok, we’ll meet at the same place like before” (and we know where it is). But this time I 
was crazy because of all this event organizing and did a stupid thing: I asked my colleague 
from Gomel - during this mobile conversation - “this place, you mean this (and named this 
place)?” 
Within 15 minutes at this place he was arrested by the police and they took him to the police 
office. He was detained for 2 days, until the state celebrations were over. 
Oh dear. 
After that, he always gives me a good kick whenever we drink vodka for this case. 
[Laugh]I guess you deserved it.  
Just a small mistake - and they can intercept key information, especially when there are 1 or 
2 persons in conversations already under surveillance. 
Yes, this was a very good example, thank you! 
3. We organized an action of memory for people who were killed by the regime, 16th of 
November, 2005. 
We knew in advance that the whole center of Minsk was under control of OMON (police 
that deals with street actions), but we decided to do this anyway. So we found several people 
with clean mobiles and send them like recons to locate possible police cars (they usually 
used hidden places to wait). These recon people report OMON movements to us a little in 
advance, so we have a chance to stay 15-20 min. on one of the main streets before OMON 
show up.  This is a tactical example. 
4. More advanced group using mobiles during elections, March 2006 
We organized a pool of volunteers. Part of them stayed on Oktyabrskaya Square in 
downtown Minsk where the main opposition actions were happening, tent camps included. 
We equipped them with clean SIM cards, and created lists of this mobile numbers. 
We also organized groups of volunteers with computers and Internet at home and gave them 
a list of these numbers. And finally, we had 2 site administrators who could post infos from 
the square to the web in real time. 
So the scheme worked like this: a volunteer from streets calls one of the PC volunteers, or 
reversed scheme; the PC volunteer types messages of what happened on the square and 
sends it via the net, via Skype, to administrators and they in turn post it on our sites. 
This is very effective in situations where authorities try to limit using traditional media and 
major opposition sites for such purposes. 
I see. 
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After that we used this scheme again in several cases. 
Did they never find a way to block it? 
This is very difficult in practice. Such volunteers are usually new people, not under 
surveillance like opposition activists. We use new SIM cards. And there is not just one 
person, but group of independent observers in a field. Same with the PCs. 
Another  question, about these ‘clean’ mobiles and SIM cards - are these newly bought pre-
paid cards? Not fixed subscriptions? 
At that moment we didn’t have pre-paid cards, the authorities would not give permission for 
such products to the operators. But they exist now. 
OK! That is an important detail. How do you proceed then? 
We use standard contracts with mobile operators using really neutral people. As far away 
from opposition members as possible. We register 5-10 numbers on them. 
So it is possible to have several contracts per person without raising suspicion? 
Some people even use so-called BOMJ - very, very poor people - for registering such stuff. 
But we do not use them. As you remember, it was a time of boom in subscriptions. 
S we were more or less ok with this, even on 1 person, because if they have family it is ok [it 
doesn’t raise suspicion]. Maybe not 10, but till 5 is ok. And 10 in really rare cases, when 
urgent situation 
It is not risky for them to help you with this? 
They can always say ‘I gave this phone to my friend and can’t control the use of it’. 
Also, I remember during big opposition events, some other organizations were using mass 
SMS sending. 
Tell me more. 
Just something like: ‘People, come 1st of September at 19.00 to October Square. Zhive 
Belarus!’ 
Where did these SMS originate from? From a server or single phone, or from many phones? 
It was possible using foreign SMS services. Professional, I can say. 
Is it still possible? 
Yes, but (1) if we use a paid foreign service, it costs a lot. And (2) if we use a phone+PC 
scheme or several phones+PC it is also possible but not for a wider audience, and it can 
easily be blocked. Good for us that a database with mobile numbers of around 1 million of 
Velcom users was posted on the Internet several years ago, by pirates. 
Are you serious? Wow, those pirates should get a Nobel prize [laugh]. 
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Yes, it was a huge scandal for the operator. It actually happened even twice. They did it 
again and, as I remember, no traces. 
Nice piece of work. 
The thing is, without such things it is only possible to send infos to a limited numbers of 
your opposition friends who usually already know about such events. 
I see. Are mobile phone numbers not available on your whitepages-type phone catalogue? 
I think no, it is closed information. Usual phones, yes. 
It is like that in Switzerland, too. But here in Norway you can find many mobile numbers by 
searching someone's name and address. 
Have you ever tried mass SMS sending to random numbers? Some of them will exist. 
We are not, not enough [financial] resources and our specialists highly advised using only 
foreign SMS services for better results.  Self-made schemes in Belarus were not very 
effective. 
Also, after the authorities understood how important it can be, on some key events like 
presidential elections and something like the referendum in 2004, they used their own SMS 
sendings or fake SMS sendings with changed message or just the opposite message. 
With ‘they’, you mean the state authorities? 
Yes, and the pro-government youth organization BRSM. It’s like the former Soviet 
Komsomol.  
Or the new Nashi now in Russia... 
Yes, it looks like Nashi. They have a 6 million USD budget per year, full access to youth, 
around 350’000 so-called members. They are also using these things [mass SMS].They have 
their own media. This is BRSM. The main goal is to just control the active youth and avoid 
any inclusion of them in opposition movements. 
Amazing. 
From the logistical sphere I can’t find good examples because the logic of logistics 
(transportation) materials in Belarus shows us:  as little as possible mobile conversations are 
better. Chances to deliver products are bigger. But usually it looks like person 1 or 2 with a 
car pre-agree with the person who’s in charge of storage or print works, and with the 
recipient. After they switch phones off and do it: pick up products from the storage man and 
deliver it to the recipient. Less clever people use mobiles but even without mobiles, if we’re 
talking big amounts, the risk of interception by the police and KGB is very high. Because 
information can leak beforehand. So it’s important to be quick. 
In Belarus, but not only here, it is possible not only hear mobile conversations but also to see 
where this person (like GPS but on base of your mobile signal) is located. I think accuracy is 
at 50-100 meters. 
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So you basically turn off your phone in critical situations like this? 
Yes. Some people take out the battery, some do not, it depends on their belief - the idea of 
whether it works with the battery in or not. I mean some people think mobiles are only fully 
inoperative without battery. Some do not. 
The police and KGB use this technology to locate opposition activists when necessary. For 
example, when we, in August 2005, tried to avoid them locating us. We switched off phones 
in an area with a lot of small houses and try to “disappear”. 
I've heard that too. Ivan from Serbia told me that in important meetings, everybody would 
put his or her mobile on the table and take the battery out . 
Yes, but it also depends on model of phone. But return to our case - they were most certainly 
in that area and tried to locate us, but in that case we managed to “disappear” successfully. 
A, one more:  search, locating and hearing concrete people is not only possible by the SIM 
card but also by the phone ID. So smart people reload from time to time ‘pereproshivka’, a  
Russian mobile software. 
Now I understand that you used both the term "clean mobile" and "clean SIM" - those are 
two different things. 
Yes. To get a clean mobile, put in a new SIM card and reload software. 
What does that software do? Is it illegal? 
BIOS [software that runs a device] is a better way to call it. Harder in new phones, easy to 
do in old ones. 
How come it is from Russia? I would think that Russian authorities would not allow such 
programs. 
Yes, but see, Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus have a similar Soviet history. Because of this, 
we have: 
- one criminal world 
- one hackers mafia 
- one market of such technologies 
In these things, we’re still very integrated.  And the KGB, or FSB [in Russia], or the police 
can just limit but not eliminate this. 
Funny that the underworld is better integrated than the official sphere. 
Oh yes, much better. Examples are hackers and specialists in special techs. Creators of bugs 
and similar thinks. 
Russia has some world-class software engineers. 
They’re usually under a KGB or police umbrella. 
 123
                                             
As in the case of the attack on Estonia81, maybe? 
Yes, it’s very possible in the Estonian case. 
They are allowed to work in limited areas, and they also work in interests of this structures. 
Plus big money and corruption. All together. 
In  the case of Belarus, would you say that you can take advantage of the "underworld" for 
your purposes? 
It’s not really an underworld because they try to be as much outside as they can from 
politics. Authorities do not tolerate political interference. 
But some good techniques helps from time to time. And they can be connected with different 
people. 
You buy software from them. 
Not software, because in Belarus the pirate market dominates and anything you want is very 
easy and legally to be found. It is a pity, but a fact. 
But some equipment may have to be bought, some services, for example changing BIOS on 
mobile. 
Ok, so you get free copies. But does that still imply that you need contacts to such people? 
Yes, sure. But usually this is personal contacts some activists. It only works on the basis of 
trust. 
Thank you so much for cooperating, Pavel. I am really looking forward to meeting you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 The main Internet infrastructure of Estonia was attacked by Russian-based hackers in 2007: “Hackers take 
down the most wired country in Europe”, WIRED magazine, 15.09.2007.  
